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MEETING THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT'S
SPECIFICITY REQUIREMENT: JUDGMENTAL AND
STATISTICAL SCORING SYSTEMS
WINNIE F. TAYLOR*
INTRODUCTION
Consumer credit has become an accepted fact of American life.
It continues to grow at a phenomenal rate as more and more buy-
ers seek to improve their standard of living by utilizing various
financing arrangements. Virtually all home purchases involve some
form of mortgage agreement' and approximately two-thirds of all
consumer automobile purchases are made on an installment pay-
ment basis. In addition, many large department stores report that
at least half of their business depends on their closed-end credit
plans.2 Total installment credit has risen 68% in the last five
years, with consumer installment debt rising by a record $44 bil-
lion in 1978.-
Americans who are constantly encouraged to become more de-
pendent on credit need to be reminded that credit is available to
them as a privilege, not as'a legal right. Everyone who wants or
needs credit cannot obtain it; each creditor devises its own method
of separating those who will receive credit from those who will
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida. B.A. 1972, Grambling State Univer-
sity, 1975, J.D. State University of New York at Buffalo, LL.M. 1979, University of
Wisconsin.
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1. G. Chandler & D. Ewert, Discrimination on the Basis of Sex Under the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (Working Paper No. 8: Credit Research Center, -Purdue University)(1976).
"But for the availability of credit, it would be impossible for most Americans to obtain an
education, purchase a car, own a home, or start a business." Comment, Equal Credit Oppor-
tunity Act Amendments of 1976, 12 U. RiCH. L. REv. 203 (1977).
2. S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& An. NEws 405.
3. Conover, Consumer Credit Sophistication Grows, CXLIV Am. BANKER 1 (1979). Out-
standing bank credit card debt was up 139% in the same period. Id.
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not.' The decision to grant or deny credit is usually based on an
evaluation of the applicant's creditworthiness, a process which gen-
erally involves evaluating a person's ability and willingness to re-
pay the creditor.
Prior to 1974 there was virtually no federal regulation of the
credit evaluation process. Most creditors looked to the proverbial
"three C's" of credit-capacity, character, and collateral-for gui-
dance in screening applicants. 5 However, use of this selection crite-
ria precipitated the complaint that female applicants were being
denied credit because of their sex or marital status rather than be-
cause they failed to meet the "three C's" standard. The problems
created by denying credit to women for reasons other than their
individual creditworthiness were formally brought to the attention
of Congress by women's groups" and by a report from the National
Commission on Consumer Finance.7 Congressional hearings8 fur-
4. Whether credit remains a "privilege" rather than a "right" is debatable. Most people
view credit as a privilege for the deserving. However, recent laws greatly curtail a creditor's
freedom to determine to whom this privilege will be extended. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON
CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDrr IN TE UNITED STATES 151 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as NATIONAL COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE].
5. The "Three C's of Credit" have been defined in the following manner: "Capacity
reflects an individual's earning power and provides a measure of his ability to repay. Collat-
eral is some form of tangible asset owned by the individual which is offered for security
against the loan. Character.. .refers to the person's moral qualities, particularly the indi-
vidual's ethical resolve to repay the loan." Churchill, Nevin & Watson, Credit Scoring: Why
and How, THE CREDIT WORLD, March 1977, at 3 [hereinafter cited as Credit Scoring: Why
and How].
6. The following women's groups were instrumental in directing Congressional atten-
tion to credit discrimination against women: Women in Equity Action League (WEAL);
Center for Women Policy Studies; [National Women's Lobby] National Organization for
Women (NOW); American Association of University Women (AAUW); National Council of
Jewish Women; National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs; League
of Women Voters; and the Washington Council of Women Businesswomen. According to
one Congressman: "Without the input of women activists pushing for credit reform, there
would be no Equal Credit Opportunity Act." Gelb & Pally, Women and Interest Group
Politics, A Cast Study of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 5 AM. POL. Q. 331, 335 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Women and Interest Group Politics].
7. The National Commission on Consumer Finance highlighted these problems in its
1972 report to the President and Congress. It identified the following as among the major
problems faced by women seeking credit:
1) Single women have more trouble obtaining credit than single men.
2) Creditors generally require a woman upon marriage to reapply for credit,
usually in her husband's name. Similar reapplication is not asked of men when
they marry.
3) Creditors are often unwilling to extend credit to a married woman in her
own name.
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ther explored these problems and substantiated the need for im-
mediate legislative action to correct them. Recognizing this need,
Congress concluded that this legislation was necessary "to insure
that the various financial institutions and other firms engaged in
the extensions of credit exercise their responsibility to make credit
available with fairness, impartiality, and without discrimination on
the basis of sex or marital status."9 Accordingly, on October 28,
1974 Congress passed the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)10
affirmatively requiring that "financial institutions and other firms
engaged in the extension of credit make that credit equally availa-
ble to all creditworthy customers without regard to sex or marital
status."' The ECOA was viewed as the first major step toward the
elimination of discrimination problems unique to female credit ap-
plicants. Congress perceived the law as a mandate to creditors to
objectively exercise their discretionary credit-granting powers, dis-
regarding sex and marital status.
Congress soon recognized that the problem of discrimination
resulting from the consideration of factors other than individual
creditworthiness was not unique to women.1 2 After thorough inves-
4) Creditors are often unwilling to count the wife's income when a married
couple applies for credit.
5) Women who are divorced or widowed have trouble reestablishing credit.
Women who are separated have a particularly difficult time, since accounts may
still be in the husband's name.
National Comm'n on Consumer Finance, supra note 4, at 152-53.
8. Credit Discrimination: Hearings on H.R. 14856 and H.R. 14908 Before the Sub-
comm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 2d
Seas. 1,129 (1974); Economic Problems of Women: Hearings Before the Joint Economic
Comm., Part 3, 93d Cong., 1st Seas. 443, 446 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Joint Economic
Comm. Hearings].
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(e) (Supp. V 1975).
10. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, §§ 501-503 88 Stat. 1521 (1974)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691(e) (Supp. V 1975)) [hereinafter cited as ECOA]. For a general
overview of the ECOA, see Littlefield, Sex-Based Discrimination and Credit Granting
Practices, 5 CONN. L. Rv. 575 (1973); Ziino, A Review of the "Federal Equal Credit Oppor-
tunity Act, 27 DRAKE L. Rv. 1 (1977-78); Maltz & Miller, The Equal Credit Opportunity
Act and Regulation B, 31 OKLA. L. REv. 1 (1978); Gates, Credit Discrimination Against
Women: Causes and Solutions, 27 Vam. L. Rav. 409 (1974); Hume, A Suggested Analysis
for Regulation of Equal Credit Opportunity, 52 WASH. L. REv. 335 (1977).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(e) (Supp. V 1975).
12. As originally proposed, the ECOA prohibited discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, national origin, and age, as well as sex and marital status. However, the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 was limited to discrimination based on sex or marital
status because (1) the classifications other than sex and marital status could not be carefully
studied before the close of the 93rd Congress, and (2) they raised different questions which
1980]
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tigation, the ECOA was amended in 197613 to expand its coverage
and prohibit discrimination in the granting of credit based on con-
sideration of race, color, religion, national origin, age, receipt of
public assistance income, or the exercise in good faith of the rights
guaranteed under the Consumer Credit Protection Act.14 This ex-
pansion was believed necessary to protect others from the same
subjective denials of credit that women had experienced prior to
the passage of the 1974 Act; specifically, denials based on reasons
other than the applicant's ability and willingness to repay.15
The ECOA has a broad scope as indicated by its applicability
to "any aspect of a credit transaction." 6 The Federal Reserve
Board has the responsibility of establishing implementation guide-
lines and otherwise ensuring creditor compliance with the Act.17
They have responded with Regulation B'2 which contains both
pre-application and post-application guidelines; its provisions can
be reduced to five basic components. The first component prohib-
needed study before legislation covering them could be enacted. See Note, Consumer Pro-
tection: The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 577, 577 n.3 (1975). See also
H.R. REP. No. 210, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1975).
13. Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691(f)
(1976) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691(e) (Supp. V 1975)).
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1691(f) (1970).
15. See Hearings on S. 483, S. 1900, S. 1961 and H.R. 5616 Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ECOA Hearings]. The Senate Banking, Hous-
ing and Urban Affairs Committee believed that factors other than ability to repay should
not be considered. The Committee concluded that "it is intolerable that the recipient of
such income [public assistance] be disadvantaged because of its source." They failed to find
a correlation between a person's ability to repay, his probability of repaying and his receipt
of public assistance benefits, assuming such income met the creditor's usual standards. The
Committee also disfavored creditors who rejected any applicant solely because of the appli-
cant's age providing the applicant had the capacity to enter into a binding agreement. S.
REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976). See also S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1976).
16. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1976). "Creditor" is defined
broadly to include a person who, in the ordinary course of business, regularly participates in
the decision of whether or not to extend credit. The term includes an assignee, transferee or
subrogee of an original creditor who so participates 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(1) (1978), but excludes
one whose only participation in the credit transaction is the honoring of a credit card. Id.
"Applicant" is defined as "any person who requests or who has received an extension of
credit from a creditor, and includes any person who is or may be contractually liable regard-
ing an extension of credit other than a guarantor, surety, endorser, or similar party." Id. at §
202.2(e).
17. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(b)(a) (1976).
18. 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1975).
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its creditors from discouraging applicants for reasons that are dis-
criminatory under the ECOA.19 For example, creditors are gener-
ally prohibited from making any inquiries regarding the appli-
cant's childbearing and birth control intentions or capabilities, or
from discouraging pregnant applicants.20 This prohibition effec-
tively thwarts pre-Regulation B application requirements such as
the infamous "baby letter. 2 1 The first component of Regulation B
also limits inquiries about the applicant's marital status. Unless a
resident of a community property state or dependent on property
located in such a state,22 an applicant applying for individual, un-
secured credit cannot be asked questions concerning marital sta-
tus.23 Similarly, a creditor is denied access to information concern-
ing an applicant's spouse if the applicant does not intend that the
spouse will use the contemplated account, be contractually liable
for it, or repay the loan with personal income.2 4 This provision al-
lows an individually creditworthy, married, female applicant to re-
ceive credit independently of her spouse, an uncommon occurrence
before Regulation B.25 The second component of Regulation B con-
cerns post-application evaluation restrictions. It prohibits creditors
from considering the likelihood that female applicants will have
children and leave the labor market permanently.2 Also, while al-
lowing creditors to consider age and source of income, Regulation
19. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (1977).
20. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(4) (1977).
21. The "baby letter" is a physician's statement which discloses the birth control
method practiced by a couple or states that the couple is unable to have children. One
Washington, D.C. mortgage lending company required a couple to submit not only the stan-
dard physician's statement on birth control, but also affidavits signed by both the husband
hnd wife in which they each agreed to abortion and/or vasectomy should their method of
birth control fail. Joint Economic Comm. Hearings, supra note 8, at 548-49.
22. Community property states have special laws concerning married persons' property
ownership rights. The complexity of these ownership rights and their effect on a creditor's
accessibility to assets in the event of default necessitates the community property exception.
The eight community property states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Texas, and Washington.
23. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(a) (1977).
24. See id. at § 202.7(d)(1).
25. Before Regulation B, most married women were granted credit only after their hus-
bands' creditworthiness was considered. This often resulted in credit denial to married wo-
men with sufficient income whenever their husbands were unemployed or otherwise without
a reliable income source. See generally 119 CONG. REc. 24061 (1973) (remarks of Sen.
Brock).
26. 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(3) (1977).
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B forbids disqualifying or penalizing an applicant because of age27
or because income is derived from annuity, pension, retirement
benefits or public assistance.2 Although the creditor cannot arbi-
trarily deny credit because the applicant's income is derived from
one or more of these sources, he may consider the probability that
such payments will continue.2 9 Third, the regulation mandates that
creditors assess the applicant's individual characteristics in deter-
mining his creditworthiness.30 If the applicant is deemed individu-
ally creditworthy, he cannot be denied an account for any of the
prohibited reasons, 1 nor can he be required to have a co-signor or
guarantor.3 2 Fourth, Regulation B refers to the notification process,
and requires that when a creditor denies a loan or otherwise takes
adverse action," he must inform the applicant of this decision,
send an ECOA notice, 4 and state specific reasons for the denial.85
27. Id. at § 202.6(b)(2). See generally notes 68-73 infra and accompanying text.
28. Id. at § 202.6(b)(2)(5).
29. Id.
30. Id. at § 202.7.
31. Id. at § 202.7(a).
32. Id. at § 202.7(d)(1). This rule, however, has exceptions. For example, a creditor may
require the signature of a co-owner of property if such property is used to support the loan
application. Additionally, in a community property state, unless both spouses have equal
management and control over the community assets, or the applicant alone has enough sep-
arate, non-community property to support the loan's repayment, both spouses can be re-
quired to sign the loan agreement. Id. at § 202.7(d)(2), (3), and (4). If the applicant is not
creditworthy, the creditor clearly may require a co-signer, but he cannot require that the co-
signer be the applicant's spouse. Id. at § 202.7(d)(5).
33. Adverse action is defined as (1) a refusal to grant credit in substantially the amount
or on substantially the terms requested by an applicant unless the creditor offers to grant
credit other than in substantially the amount or on substantially the terms requested by the
applicant, and the applicant uses or expressly accepts the credit offered; (2) a termination of
an account or an unfavorable change in terms of an account that does not affect all or a
substantial portion of a classification of a creditor's accounts; or (3) a refusal to increase the
amount of credit available to an applicant when the applicant requests an increase in accor-
dance with procedures established by the creditor for the type 6f credit involved. Id. at §
202.2(c)(1).
34. Regulation B contains the following sample ECOA notice:
The Federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act prohibits creditors from discrimi-
nating against credit applicants on the basis of race, color, religion, national ori-
gin, sex, marital status, or age (provided that the applicant has the capacity to
enter into a binding contract); because all or part of the applicant's income de-
rives from any public assistance program; or because the applicant has exercised
any right under the Consumer Credit Protection Act. The federal agency that
administers compliance with this law concerning this creditor is (name and ad-
dress as specified by the appropriate agency listed in Appendix A of Regulation
B).
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Finally, the regulation addresses record retention, penalties and i-
abilities under the Act, the ECOA's relationship to state law, and
enforcement provisions. Creditors are required to retain all records
pertainent to an application for 25 months. 8 Generally, where
state law conflicts with the ECOA or Regulation B on recordkeep-
ing or any other area, the federal law will prevail unless the state
law is more favorable to the consumer.3 The intent is to provide
consumers with the maximum protection. This is further illus-
trated by the liberal damages provision of Regulation B, under
which an aggrieved applicant may sue for punitive damages of up
to $10,000 in an individual suit and may, in a class action suit, sue
for the lesser of $500,000 or one percent of the creditor's net
worth.38 Enforcement of these provisions is primarily vested in the
Federal Trade Commission.89 Additionally, the Attorney General is
Id. at § 202.9(b)(1).
35. Id. at § 202.9(b)(2).
36. Id. at § 202.12(b)(1).
37. Regulation B sets forth five instances in which the federal act would prevail over an
inconsistent state law. They include instances where state law.
(i) requires or permits a practice or act prohibited by the act or its Regulations;
(ii) prohibits the individual extension of consumer credit to both parties to a
marriage if each spouse individually and voluntarily applies for such credit;
(iii) prohibits inquiries or collection of data required by the ECOA or its
Regulations;
(iv) prohibits asking age or considering age in a demonstrably and statistically
sound, empirically derived credit system to determine a pertinent element of
creditworthiness, or to favor an elderly applicant; or
(v) prohibits inquiries necessary to establish or administer a special purpose
credit program as defined in Regulation B, § 202.8.
Id. § 202.11(b)(1).
38. 12 C.F.R. § 202.1(c), citing 15 U.S.C. § 1691(e) (1977). Additionally, a successful
plaintiff may recover actual damages, court costs and attorney's fees. Id., citing 15 U.S.C. §
1691(e) (1977).
39. While the Federal Trade Coiazmission is responsible for the general enforcement of
the ECOA, other federal agencies and the Attorney General can enforce Regulation B in
certain situations. These other agencies are: the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for
banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System; the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board for FSLIC-insured savings institutions; the National Credit Union Association for
federal credit unions; the Comptroller of Currency for national banks; the Federal Reserve
Banks for state member banks; the Civil Aeronautics Board for creditors subject to the
Board; the Interstate Commerce Commission for creditors subject to the Commission; the
Small Business Administration for small business investment companies; the Packers and
Stockyard Administration for creditors subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act; the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission for brokers and dealers; and the Farm Credit Adminis-
tration for federal land banks, federal land bank associations, federal intermediate credit
banks and production credit associations. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(o) (Supp. V 1975). The Attorney
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given enforcement authority so that its experience in other areas of
discrimination can be utilized.4 °
Many of the ECOA's general requirements are worthy of fur-
ther discussion and analysis. This article, however, focuses on the
requirement that creditors give rejected applicants "specific" rea-
sons for credit denial, and bxamines the reasons given rejected ap-
plicants by creditors to determine whether these reasons substan-
tively or technically violate the ECOA specificity requirement."1
Before proceeding further, one point merits clarification: a finding
that a reason is "specific" does not necessarily eliminate the possi-
bility that discrimination has occurred. Conversely, failure to give
a specific reason does not automatically prove discrimination. The
utility of the statement of reason is that one may infer from the
reason given, whether discrimination has occurred; the more spe-
cific the reason, the easier it is to make that determination. How-
ever, whether discrimination has actually occurred is not the ques-
tion addressed in this article; rather, this article examines whether
the creditors are giving specific reasons consistent with Congres-
sional intent and, if they are not, whether they are capable of giv-
ing reasons which comport with Congressional policy objectives.
The article will further examine whether the Federal Reserve
Board's guidelines effectively implement these Congressional ob-
jectives and the major problems of compliance these regulations
General can enforce the ECOA when other governmental agencies with enforcement respon-
sibilities refer matters to the Justice Department for litigation or when he has reason to
believe creditors are engaging in patterns and practices of discrimination in violation of the
Act. 12 C.F.R. § 202.1(c)(4) (1977). Patterns and practice suits involve a creditor who dis-
criminates against certain kinds of applicants on a regular basis. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(e),(h)
(1976); Note, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976: A Meaningful Step
Toward the Elimination of Credit Discrimination, 26 CAm. L. REv. 149, 154 n.42 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as A Meaningful $tep].
40. According to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, the
Attorney General is given enforcement authority because "that office's experience in the
enforcement of other civil rights legislation can be effectively expanded and built on to
achieve maximum compliance with the antidiscrimination policies on the Equal Credit Op-
portunity Act." S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1976). On February 21, 1978, the
Justice Department publicly announced the establishment of a special twelve attorney unit
to investigate ECOA complaints and to take legal action against creditors who illegally dis-
criminate in their lending practices. Letter from Walter Gorman, Justice Dep't, to author
(Feb. 21, 1978).
41. References to the "specificity requirement" hereinafter mean the ECOA require-
ment that creditors give rejected applicants specific reasons for credit denial. "Statement of
reasons requirement" and "specificity requirement" will be used interchangeably through-
out this article.
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have caused the various types of credit evaluation systems. Finally,
in light of the problems presented, the practicality of revising the
specificity requirement will be evaluated.
I. THE SPECIFICITY PROBLEM
The goal of insuring credit availability without discrimination
is not easily achieved. Antidiscrimination legislation is of minimal
benefit if those it ,is designed to protect do not know or cannot
prove that they were discriminated against. The nation's civil
rights cases are replete with examples of the difficulties presented
in detecting and establishing discrimination.42
Applicants denied credit prior to the passage of ECOA, even if
they suspected discrimination, had little basis upon which to chal-
lenge the denial. The 1975 version of Regulation B attempted to
remedy this situation by requiring that: "[A] creditor shall provide
each applicant who is denied credit or whose account is terminated
the reasons for such action, if the applicant so requests. '43 The
Federal Reserve Board believed that this requirement would sig-
nificantly aid in insuring private and administrative enforcement
of the Act. Moreover, it was hoped that the statement of reasons
"would greatly assist consumers in determining whether they have
been discriminated against."44 While this legislative effort helped
protect consumers, the new requirement was nevertheless criticized
by consumers because it did not go far enough to protect them.
First, they noted that creditors were not required to inform appli-
cants of their right to receive the "reasons," and few creditors gra-
tuitously provide this information. Second, consumers complained
that the "reasons" when given were often ambiguous or inapplica-
ble to a given applicant's situation. For example, often the creditor
would simply state that denial was based on the applicant's failure
to meet the creditor's "internal policies." Third, the vague reasons
42. See generally Comment, A Last Stand on Arlington Heights: Title VIII and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 150 (1978); see also Comment,
supra note 1, at 208-10. In comparing the ECOA with the Truth-in-Lending Act, the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs noted that "[d]iscriminatory practices,
unlike violations of Truth-in-Lending, are not apparent from the face of particular docu-
ments or contracts." S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1976).
43. Original Regulation B (amended 1976), 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(m)(2) (1976).
44. See Hearings on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking, Currency and
Housing, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1975) (statement of Sheldon Feldman).
1980]
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often left the rejected applicant not knowing how to meet the
credit standards.45
The 1976 congressional amendments to the ECOA addressed
these consumer concerns with the following provision:
Each applicant against whom adverse action is taken shall be entitled to a
statement of reasons for such action from the creditor .... A statement of
reasons meets the requirement of this section only if it contains the specific
reason for the adverse action taken.'
For the first time, federal legislation afforded rejected credit
applicants an automatic right to discover why adverse action was
taken.47 A creditor satisfied this requirement by either automati-
cally giving an applicant against whom adverse action was taken a
statement of specific reasons, or by informing the applicant of his
right to receive such a statement if a timely request is made.48 The
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs consid-
ered the "specific reasons" requirement to be "among the most sig-
nificant parts of the [amendment]' 49 because it is "a strong and
45. Feminist groups were among those who felt that the provision requiring creditors to
give reasons for denial needed strengthening. They were particularly concerned that credi-
tors were not required to inform an applicant about the right to such a statement. These
groups also anticipated an enforcement problem if creditors gave their statements orally.
Women and Interest Group Politics, supra note 6, at 348.
46. Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691(f)
(1976) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691(e) (Supp. V 1975)) (emphasis added).
47. See supra note 33, for the Regulation B definition of "adverse action."
48. If the creditor discloses in the written notice of adverse action that the applicant
has a right to receive a statement of reasons, the applicant must also be informed that he
will receive the reasons within 30 days after receipt by the creditor of a request made within
60 days of such notification. Additionally, the creditor must provide the name, address and
telephone number of the person or office from which the reasons can be obtained. Oral
statements of reasons may be given if the adverse action notification includes a disclosure of
the applicant's right to have the oral statement of reasons confirmed in writing within 30
days after a written request for confirmation is received by the creditor. Equal Credit Op-
portunity Act Amendments of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691(f) (1976).
49. S. REP. No. 239, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976). The new specificity requirement's
significance is best illustrated by comparing the "statement of reasons" in the original Regu-
lation B to the statement required by the amended version. The original Regulation B re-
quired creditors to give a statement of reasons for denial only if the applicant so requested.
Original Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(m)(2) (1975). Additionally, there was no express
requirement that "specific" reasons be given. Thus, a creditor, while required to give reasons
under limited circumstances, was not expressly required to give specific reasons for denial.
The amendments to Regulation B, requiring that creditors automatically provide rejected
credit applicants with statements of "specific reasons" explaining the denial, or notice of
their right to receive the reasons, give more protection to the consumer.
The ECOA's legislative history does not explain why the word "specific" was added to
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necessary adjunct to the antidiscrimination purpose of the legisla-
tion, for only if creditors know they must explain their decisions
will they effectively be discouraged from discriminatory prac-
tices."50 Furthermore, in enacting this requirement Congress ful-
filled a broader need: consumer education. Rejected credit appli-
cants can learn where and how their credit status is deficient,
instead of merely learning that they do not meet a particular credi-
tor's standards. Knowing that the reason for the denial is their
short residence in the area, or their recent change of employment,
or their already over-extended financial situation not only allows
credit applicants the opportunity to correct problems with their
fiscal situation, but also affords them the opportunity to bring to
the creditor's attention errors caused by misinformation or inade-
quate information. 1 The creditor therefore is required to give the
rejected applicant an accurate reason for denial and meaningful in-
formation to aid the applicant in becoming an acceptable credit
risk. Previously used reasons such as failure to meet the creditor's
"internal standards," or failure to achieve the "qualifying score"
now expressly violate the specificity requirement.52
The fundamental purpose of the specificity requirement, how-
ever, was not consumer education, but consumer protection from
discrimination. By requiring the creditor to provide "specific rea-
sons," Congress provided both a check on creditor discrimination
and an evidentiary tool if creditors disregarded their mandate. In
addition, the requirement benefits creditors by establishing a valu-
able communicative network anq by improving relations between
creditors and the public.
An understanding of the purposes underlying the promulga-
tion of the specificity requirement does not necessarily lead to an
understanding of what degree of specificity satisfies the ECOA.
The Federal Reserve Board has the primary responsibility of de-
termining the degree of specificity that suffices, and Congress has
provided guidelines to aid the Board in their determination. The
lawmakers felt that a statement of reasons in long, detailed, per-
the 1976 provision. Congress may have viewed the reason for its inclusion as obvious; it may
be that the logical implication of including "specific" was to further describe and clarify the
kinds of reasons which would satisfy the requirement.
50. S. REP. No. 239, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976).
51. Id.
52. 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(b)(2) (1980).
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sonal letter form was unnecessary, and instead sanctioned a
"checklist" format, with the proviso that the checklist give a con-
cise indication of the application's deficiencies. 53 Accordingly, the
Federal Reserve Board prepared a sample chacklist statement of
reasons as a model for creditors to follow.5' If the Board's form is
53. S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976). The legislative history states that the
Federal Reserve Board's regulations may suggest formats for the statements of reasons.
During the ECOA hearings the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee was
presented with model letters by various witnesses. The Committee acknowledged the brev-
ity of these letters but did not completely endorse any of them. Id. at 8-10, reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 410, 411.
54. Section 202.9(b)(2) of Regulation B contains the sample form and generally relates
to the statement of specific reasons requirement. It provides a creditor with the option of
formulating his or her own statement, or adopting, in whole or in part, the one prepared by
the Board. The sample form provides as follows:
PRINCIPAL REASON(S) FOR ADVERSE ACTION CONCERNING CREDIT:
[ Credit application incomplete
[ Insufficient credit references
[ Unable to verify credit references
Temporary or irregular employment
Unable to verify employment
[ Length of employment
[ Insufficient income
[ Excessive obligations
[ Unable to verify income
[ Inadequate collateral
[ We do not grant credit to any applicant on the terms and conditions you
request
[ Too short a period of residence
[ Temporary residence
[ Unable to verify residence
[ No credit file
Insufficient credit file
Delinquent credit obligations
[ Garnishment, attachment, foreclosure, repossession, or suit
[ Bankruptcy
Other specify.
DISCLOSURE OF USE OF INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM AN OUTSIDE SOURCE
[ Disclosure inapplicable
Information obtained in a report from a consumer reporting agency
Name:
Address:
Telephone Number:
[ Information obtained from an outside source other than a consumer report-
ing agency. Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, you have the right to
make a written request, within 60 days of receipt of this notice, for disclo-
sure of the nature of the adverse information.
Creditor's name:
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properly used, a creditor is insulated from violation of the specific-
ity requirement;55 if the creditor drafts his own form, he does so at
the risk of violating Regulation B. Unfortunately, Regulation B
does not provide a procedure which allows creditors to have their
individual forms approved. Consequently, most creditors use the
model form prepared by the Federal Reserve Board.56 However,
consumers are often dissatisfied with the information they receive
from the model form.57 Some applicants complain that the check-
list format itself does not fulfill Congressional objectives because it
fails to accurately inform them of the specific reasons for denial
and because it fails to give them adequate information on credit
standards so they may work toward meeting those standards.5 " Ad-
ditionally, others claim that some creditors substantively violate
the ECOA by failing to give reasons consistent with those in the
Creditor's address:
Creditor's telephone number.
[Add ECOA Notice]
55. 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(b)(2) (1980).
56. In the fall of 1977, the author made an informal survey of a cross section of judg-
mental creditors in the Madison, Wisconsin area, and almost all of those surveyed re-
sponded that they used the model form in giving reasons for denial. The ECOA Compliance
Manuals prepared by the Credit Union National Association and the American Bankers
Association recommend the model form. Conversations with representatives from both
groups revealed that the overwhelming majority of banks and credit unions who use judg-
mental evaluation systems use the model form. Additionally, the author's survey of the
F.T.C.'s ECOA complaint files and the Wisconsin's Office of Commissioner of Banking
(OCB) consumer complaint fies revealed that most judgmental creditors rely on the model
form. See note 54 supra.
57. The data revealing this dissatisfaction was collected from Wisconsin's OCB con-
sumer complaint files and the F.T.C.'s ECOA complaint files. In the fall of 1977, the author
conducted a study on the consumer complaint handling process followed by the Wisoncsin
OCB. Eighteen complaints alleging credit discrimination based on sex or marital status and
the adequacy of the complaint handling process were examined. A major aspect studied was
whether creditors who denied credit gave specific reasons to the rejected applicants. More
than half of the complaints received by the OCB from March 1, 1976 through February 28,
1977 questioned whether the creditor's reasons for denial sufficiently complied with the re-
quirements of the ECOA.
In January 1978, the author visited the F.T.C. offices and reviewed its ECOA complaint
files to determine the number of consumers who complained that the reasons they received
for credit denial lacked specificity. A random sample was obtained from the 1,186 com-
plaints received by the F.T.C. between March, .1977 and January, 1978. The complaints of
approximately one-third of the sample related to reasons for denial. Of this one-third, ap-
proximately one-third related to whether specific reasons were being given. Thus, approxi-
mately one of every three complaints received by the F.T.C. relating to reasons for denial
raised the specificity question.
58. See text accompanying notes 50-52 supra.
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Board's checklist. Thus, some creditors are challenged for using
the checklist format and others are challenged for failing to use it.
The kind of challenge made primarily depends upon the type of
credit evaluation system used by the creditors.
11. JUDGMENTAL & STATISTICAL SCORING SYSTEMS
Creditors use two types of evaluation systems in deciding
whether to grant credit: the judgmental scoring system, and the
statistical scoring system, both of which appraise each new appli-
cant as a credit risk. In order to understand and appreciate the
problems creditors face in complying with the ECOA specificity re-
quirement, it is first important to understand how judgmental and
statistical scoring systems operate.
Judgmental scoring, the older and more frequently used sys-
tem,59 involves a subjective process whereby a credit manager looks
at the applicant's personal characteristics and other information
and evaluates the applicant's ability and willingness to repay. Typ-
ically, information such as home ownership, income, length of em-
ployment and credit references is relied upon. The credit manager
evaluates the character, capacity and collateral of the applicant in
light of the application information.. Thereafter, the manager
makes a professional judgment to grant or deny credit, relying in
part on his past experiences as a credit risk evaluator.60The follow-
ing hypothetical indicates one possible application of the judgmen-
tal system. Assume applicant A, age 25, owns a home, is married,
and has an annual income of $15,000; applicant B, age 19, is single,
rents and has an annual income of $9,600. Applicant A is granted a
loan, and applicant B is denied the same loan. The decision to
grant credit to applicant A. and deny it to applicant B may be ex-
plained by noting that, in the eyes of the judgmental creditor, a
married person is less of a risk than a single person; a 25-year old
is more stable than a 19-year old; one who owns a home is a better
credit risk than a renter; and $15,000 is an adequate income to
support the loan while $9,600 is not. Under Regulation B, the cred-
itor's explanation for granting credit to applicant A while denying
59. Regulation B defines a judgmental system as any credit evaluation system other
than a statistical scoring system. Regulation B § 202.2(t) (1975). Despite the growing popu-
larity of scoring systems, judgmental systems are still in the majority. Myers & Forgy, The
Development of Numerical Credit Evaluation Systems, 58 AM. STATISTICAL A. J. 799 (1963).
60. See Boggess, Screen Test Your Credit Risk, 1967 HARv. Bus. REV. 113, 114 (1967).
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it to applicant B is unacceptable because the Federal Reserve
Board sanctions the use of judgmental systems only if no discrimi-
nation on the prohibited bases results."1 In the above hypothetical,
the assumption that a single person is less likely to repay a loan
discriminates on the basis of marital status, which the ECOA ex-
pressly prohibits.6 2 Furthermore, although the creditor is free to
determine how income and housing status will be evaluated," Reg-
ulation B specifically prescribes how creditors who use a judgmen-
tal system may evaluate age. A creditor may consider the appli-
cant's age only for the purpose of determining a "pertinent
element of creditworthiness,"'" which the regulation defines as in-
formation about the applicant which the creditor considers to have
a demonstrable relationship to the determination of creditworthi-
ness.6 5 In other words, age may be considered only if it is mani-
festly related to the question of whether the applicant will repay.
Thus, a creditor may not arbitrarily deny loans to 19 year old ap-
plicants, but may consider their age in assessing the significance of
their length of employment or residence; for example, a young ap-
plicant may have just entered the job market or may have just re-
cently established a residence. Similarly, under Regulation B, eld-
erly66 applicants, who have often been the objects of unfavorable
credit determinations and have generally been viewed negatively
by creditors, 7 may not be disfavored simply because of their age.68
61. 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(a) (1977).
62. Id. at §§ 202.4, 202.2(u).
63. Information regarding income level and housing status does not relate directly to a
prohibited basis. The information cannot be used, however, to violate the "effects test" con-
cept of the ECOA. Id. at § 202.6(a) note 7; see notes 198-204 infra and accompanying text.
64. 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(2)(iii) (1977).
65. Id. at § 202.2(y).
66. "Elderly" means age 62 or older. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(o) (1977).
67. For example, prior to the promulgation of Regulation B, many creditors regarded
all retired persons as unacceptable credit risks and refused to grant them credit. Others
refused to make certain types of loans, such as mortgages to elderly applicants, regardless of
the likelihood of repayment. Regulation B expressly prohibits these arbitrary considera-
tions. Creditors may, however, consider the length of time to retirement of an applicant to
ascertain whether the applicant's retirement income will support the extension of credit
until the loan matures. Creditors may also consider the adequacy of any security offered if
the duration of the loan will exceed the applicant's life expectancy. For example, an elderly
applicant might not qualify for a five-percent down, 30-year mortgage because the loan's
duration exceeds the applicant's life expectancy and the cost of realizing on the collateral
might exceed the applicant's equity, although the same applicant might qualify with a larger
downpayment and a shorter loan maturity. 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(2)(iii) note 9 (1977).
68. A creditor may, however, always use age to an elderly applicant's favor. Id. at §
1980]
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The other credit evaluation system, credit or statistical scor-
ing, 9 employs empirical techniques to statistically predict the
probability that the applicant will repay.70 Typically, certain
financial and nonfinancial 'characteristics are rated by a series of
point scores; for example, points are given for income, length of
employment, occupation and home ownership. The point values for
each applicant are accumulated, and the credit decision is made by
comparing the total score. to a statistical sampling of applicants
with similar credentials. If the applicant scores higher than the
predetermined cutoff score, credit is granted.7 1 The basic assump-
tion underlying this system is that an individual's personal charac-
teristics can be employed to predict his or her character or
probability of repayment.72 Because scoring systems use an objec-
tive standard to evaluate applicants, many (including Congress)
believe that they are more accurate and effective than the subjec-
tive judgmental systems.73
The Federal Reserve Board sanctions the use of a credit scor-
ing system if it is empirically derived and demonstratively and
statistically sound. A scoring system is considered to be empiri-
cally derived if it evaluates creditworthiness primarily by allocat-
ing points to key applicant attributes,7 4 with the points being de-
rived from an empirical comparison of the creditor's creditworthy
and noncreditworthy applicant population, and with the appli-
cant's entire score, either alone or in conjunction with other infor-
mation, determining his creditworthiness.7 A scoring system is de-
monstratively and statistically sound if it "is developed for the
purpose of predicting the creditworthiness of applicants with re-
202.6(2)(iv).
69. The terms "statistical scoring" and "credit scoring" will be used interchangeably
throughout this article.
70. See generally Hsia, Credit Scoring and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 30 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 371 (1978).
71. Id. For a more detailed analysis of how scoring systems operate, see ECOA Hear-
ings, supra note 15, at 441.
72. Credit Scoring: Why and How, supra note 5 at 3.
73. See Hearings on S. 483, S. 1927 and H.R. 6516 Before the Subcom. on Consumer
Affairs of the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975); Boggess, supra note 60, at 114-15; Buel & Lewis, Credit-Scoring-and Beyond,
BANKING, Feb. 1969, at 42; Geltzer & Feldman, An Analysis of the Impact of Revised Regu-
lation B on Retailer and Bank Creditors, 33 Bus. LAW. 129 (1977).
74. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(p)(1) (1977).
75. Id. at § 202.2(p)(ii). See also Hsia, supra note 70.
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spect to the legitimate business interests of the creditor utilizing
the system, including, but not limited to, minimizing bad debt
losses and operating expenses in accordance with the creditor's
business judgment .... .6' In order to be considered demonstra-
tively and statistically sound, a scoring system must meet three
statistical standards.7 7 First, the system must be based on "accu-
rate developmental data," that is, the data used to develop the sys-
tem must consist of either the whole applicant population, includ-
ing both accepted and rejected applicants, or a proper sample
drawn from the whole applicant population. 8 Second, the scoring
system must be "validated." The validation process tests the de-
gree of accuracy of the scoring system's ability to predict the
creditworthiness of an arbitrarily chosen applicant 9 by running an
independent check to see if the system predicts creditworthiness in
the manner for which it was designed. Also, the scoring system
must be able to separate creditworthy and noncreditworthy appli-
cants at a "statistically significant rate,"80 which means that the
system's predictive accuracy should be better than a completely
random process.81 Third, the system must periodically be revali-
dated by using an applicant sample that represents the creditor's
most recent applicant population. 2 If revalidation reflects a
change in the applicant population that produces a decline in the
scoring system's predictive ability, the system must be adjusted to
reestablish its predictive accuracy. 3
Unlike the creditor using a judgmental system, the creditor
employing a demonstrably and statistically sound, empirically de-
rived scoring system is allowed to use an appplicant's age as a pre-
dictive variable." The only limitation under Regulation B is that
applicants 62 years of age or older must receive the same number
of points as anyone under age 62;85 this implies that young appli-
76. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(p)(2)(ii) (1977).
77. See generally Hsia, supra note 70.
78. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(p)(2)(i) (1944).
79. See Fair Issaa & Company, Inc., A Statistical Assessment of Model Performance
Upon Validation, Position Paper 3.
80. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(p)(2)(iii) (1977).
81. See Hsia, supra note 70, at 379.
82. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(p)(2)(iv) (1977).
83. Id.
84. Id. at § 202.6(b)(2)(ii).
85. Id.
19801
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
cants can be assigned fewer points in the age category if the dis-
tinction can be statistically supported. Moreover, unlike judgmen-
tal systems, there is no requirement that scoring systems only
consider age if it is manifestly related to the applicant's ability to
repay. Thus, scoring systems are given greater flexibility than judg-
mental systems in using age as a predictive variable.
Although the ECOA specificity problems faced by judgmental
and statistical scoring creditors bear some similarity, for the most
part they are very different. For this reason, it is now necessary to
separate discussion of the two systems in order to analyze the
problems related to each. Based on this analysis it will then be
possible to suggest solutions to these specificity problems.
III. MEETING THE ECOA SPECIFICITY REQUIREMENT -
JUDGMENTAL CREDITORS
A. Inadequacies in Present Practices
Since the use by a judgmental creditor of the Federal Reserve
Board's checklist reasons raises an irrebuttable presumption of
compliance with the specificity requirement, the overwhelming ma-
jority of judgmental creditors rely on the model checklist state-
ment when giving reasons to applicants who are denied credit.8
Despite the Board's pronouncement that the model checklist is un-
questionably specific, 87 the form's terse responses do not necessa-
rily meet the consumer's need for specific explanations.
This need for specificity can be seen by examining consumer
criticism of several checklist reasons. The "insufficient credit refer-
ences" reason has been severely criticized by rejected applicants
because it fails to tell them how they can meet the creditor's re-
quirements. The statement only raises the question of what "suffi-
cient" is, and without further explanation, an applicant is left to
speculate as to what will meet the creditor's standards. Consumers
have also complained about the vagueness of the "insufficient in-
come" checklist reason.e8 An applicant who believes his income is
86. See note 54 supra.
87. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(b)(2) (1977).
88. Illustrative of consumer dissatisfaction with the checklist reasons is a complaint
received by the Wisconsin Office of the Commissioner of Banking in which the complainant
alleged she was not given a specific reason when a bank denied her loan application. The
reasons given for the denial were "insufficient income" and "inappropriate credit refer-
ences." According to her complaint, these reasons left her "puzzled as to the dollar amount I
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"sufficient" to justify granting him credit would encounter major
difficulties in attempting to prove this or in attempting to prove
that the denial was discriminatory without first knowing the credi-
tor's definition of "sufficient". Many consumer complaints assert
that, at a minimum, the ECOA legislative history indicates a Con-
gressional intention that this type of crucial information be given
to rejected credit applicants."
Similarly, the Congressional purpose would seem only to be
fulfilled when denials based on "too short a period of residency,"
also informed the consumer of how long a period is necessary to
satisfy the creditor's standards. The applicant being fully informed
can then concede that the creditor is acting reasonably in requiring
a longer period, correct misinformation the creditor used in mak-
ing his decision or file a discrimination complaint. Therefore, for
specificity purposes, the creditor should inform the applicant of ex-
actly what period of residency is required.
Problems also arise when "temporary or irregular employ-
ment" is cited as a reason for denial. For example, are migrant or
other seasonal workers considered to be "temporarily or irregu-
larly" employed? Does it make a difference if these workers have
been employed during harvest season for ten consecutive years?
What about construction workers and Comprehensive Employ-
ment Training Act (CETA)90 employees? Are they temporary or
permanent workers? The creditor's requirements and standards of
evaluating an applicant's employment should be made known to
the applicant.
Another criterion presently used is the "credit application in-
complete" reason. Standing alone, this statement does little to ex-
plain the actual basis for denial. Where is the application incom-
plete? What defects are fatal? Did the applicant fail to give critical
must earn and the references I must have to qualify for a card." The applicant felt that if
the specificity requirement had been met, she would not have been baffled by the creditor's
requirements because the reasons for denial would have stated them clearly.
89. See note 49 supra. Congress placed great emphasis on getting specific information
to the applicant in order to enable him to correct any deficiency in the application.
90. The CETA program was established to provide training and employment opportu-
nities for unemployed, economically disadvantaged and under-employed persons. The pro-
grams which provide the training or employment experience are government funded. Typi-
caly, the funds are allocated for one year or less, without any commitment to fund the
program during the next fiscal year. Because future employment is in jeopardy until govern-
ment budgeting and fiscal allocations are announced, it is unclear whether CETA employees
are permanent or temporary workers. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 801, 802 (1978).
1980]
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information, such as income, or merely forget to fill in the zip
code?91 Perhaps the Federal Reserve Board recognized potential
problems with the "credit application incomplete" reason because
they included in Regulation B the requirement that: "[W]here an
application is incomplete, a creditor shall make reasonable efforts
to notify the applicant of the incompleteness and shall allow the
applicant a reasonable opportunity to complete the application."92
By giving the applicant an opportunity to correct the deficiency,
this provision transforms the uninformative "credit application in-
complete" statement into a meaningful explanation of the reason
for denial.
Unfortunately, Regulation B does not require a similar effort
on the creditor's part to assist applicants in understanding vague
checklist reasons or in correcting inaccurate information. For ex-
ample, a person denied credit because of "insufficient credit refer-
ences" is not given an opportunity to list, prior to denial, refer-
ences available to him which may be sufficient. The dame situation
arises when an applicant is rejected because of "inadequate collat-
eral." Similar complaints are often s registered about the model
checklist reasons that relate to the applicant's credit history, such
as "insufficient credit references," "insufficient file" and "no credit
file." If the creditor obtains negative information regarding an ap-
91. At one time, zip code was considered minor information on the application form.
Recently, however, zip code has become a crucial consideration to some creditors who en-
gage in the practice of credit card "red-lining" by giving lower point ratings to applicants
who reside within certain regions of the country or within specific zip codes within these
regions. Evaluating zip codes in this manner results in credit denial to persons who are
otherwise acceptable on the basis of where they live. To prevent this type of discrimination,
Senator Carl Levin (D.-Mich.) has introduced a bill (S. 15) which would amend the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act to prohibit discrimination in the issuance of credit cards on the
basis of geography. The Senate Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs Committee conducted
hearings on the bill in June 1979. A similar bill, H.R. 157, which prohibits discrimination on
the basis of residence, has been referred to the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and
Urban Affairs.
92. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(f) (1977).
93. Almost one-third of all reasons complained of to the Wisconsin Office of the Com-
missioner of Banking relate to credit history. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
These reasons include: "insufficient credit data," "credit references inappropriate," "no sat-
isfactory credit history," "information received from the credit bureau," "terrible credit,"
"unable to verify credit references," and "no established credit rating." The author's survey
of the F.T.C. ECOA complaints also revealed that most reasons complained of related to
credit history. Among them were: "information from credit bureau," "previous pay record,"
"insufficient credit history information," "unfavorable report from credit bureau," and
"credit report did not contain sufficient information."
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plicant from a credit reporting agency, he is required to list the
name and address of the credit bureau issuing the negative credit
report, but he need not list the specific credit reference he found to
be unsatisfactory.9 Therefore, the applicant is left to surmise
which reference the creditor found unfavorable.9 5
Because the specificity requirement is so new, few courts have
had an opportunity to decide whether the various checklist reasons
presently used are in compliance with it. However, two decisions
seem to indicate that the courts will carefully examine the reasons
given to determine whether they meet the Congressional objective
of providing consumers with reliable and useful credit information.
The cases point out that merely saying to an applicant that some
deficiency exists or may exist in the application is insufficient to
satisfy the ECOA requirement that the precise reasons for denial
be given. In Carroll v. Exxon Company,9 6 a federal district court
held that Exxon violated the specificity requirement when it de-
nied credit to a single working woman and gave its reason as being
that the credit bureau it had contacted could furnish "little or no
information" regarding the applicant's established credit.97 While
this was true, the court found that Exxon's decision to deny credit
was based on several factors.98 However, the only reason for denial
that Exxon had communicated to the plaintiff was that the report
received from the credit bureau was insufficient. The court rea-
94. This is consistent with the requirement of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681(t) (1970). Yet a strong argument can be made that specificity was
intended to reach beyond the FCRA's requirements. The ECOA's legislative history seems
to imply that Acts requiring less than specific reasons are subordinate to it, unless the
ECOA expressly provides otherwise. Thus, the statement "Your credit record shows that
repayment on your Sears account was sporadic" seems more attuned to the specificity re-
quirement's objectives than a general statement that the applicant's credit history was
unsatisfactory.
95. One complaint received by the Wisconsin's OCB illustrates the gravity of this prob-
lem. The complainant alleged she had listed five credit references of varying types (e.g.,
bank, retailer) on her credit application. When she was told her application was denied due
to "insufficient credit data," she was confused about the creditor's requirements. Her com-
plaint noted that she was left to guess which references failed to meet the creditor's stan-
dards. Moreover, she could not understand what the reason meant without further explana-
tion: for example, did "insufficient credit references" mean that the type of reference (bank,
retailer) did not meet creditor approval, or did it mean that the type is sufficient but her
credit record contains a defect (charge-off, failure to pay previous debts according to terms,
etc.) which the creditor finds unsatisfactory?
96. 434 F. Supp. 557 (E.D. La. 1977).
97. Id. at 562.
98. Id.
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soned that Exxon's failure to disclose all its reasons for denying
credit prevented the applicant from obtaining accurate and relia-
ble information concerning her credit status. Citing the legislative
history of the specificity requirement, the court held that "Exxon's
responses to plaintiff's request for specific reasons for the credit
denial fail to achieve the informative purposes legislated in the
ECOA." Similarly, in Berg v. Amoco Oil Co.,100 the plaintiff's ap-
plication for a credit card was denied for the stated reason that the
company was "unable to obtain sufficient information to justify the
establishing of a credit account at this time."10 1 The court con-
cluded that this statement was inadequate because it left the ap-
plicant in the dark as to why the information obtained from the
credit bureau was not "sufficient." Furthermore, the court noted
that Regulation B "must be construed to require that the state-
ment of reasons be intelligible to the applicant and that it provide
him or her with the opportunity to evaluate whether the impedi-
ment is one which can be removed. 10 2 As a result, Amoco was
found in violation of the specificity requirement and Mr. Berg re-
ceived $1,000 in damages, plus attorney's fees.los Interestingly, the
99. Id.
100. Berg v. Amoco Oil Co., No. 76-C-554 (W.D.Wis.June 3, 1977).
101. Id. slip op. at 2. After making several requests for a specific reason for denial, the
plaintiff received the following letter:
Dear Customer.
Thank you for your recent credit card information.
After checking with the credit bureau serving your area, we were unable to
obtain sufficient information to jutify the establishing of a credit account at this
time. Our investigation was conducted with:
Credit Bureau of:
24 N. Carroll St.
Madison, Wisconsin
We are sorry if this inconveniences you.
Yours truly,
NEW ACCOUNTS CENTER
Letter from plaintiff's attorney Steven A. Bach of Cassidy, Wendell, Center & Lipman,
Madison, Wisconsin to author.
102. Berg v. Amoco Oil Co., No. 76-C-554 slip op. at 1-2.
103. It should be remembered that a court is given great latitude in assessing damages
for ECOA violations. One single violation triggers the damages provision, which allows an
individual plaintiff to recover up to $10,000 in punitive damages, plus actual damages and
court costs. 12 C.F.R. § 202.1(c), citing 15 U.S.C. § 1691(e) (1977). It is conceivable that a
court might award a successful plaintiff the $10,000 maximum for a creditor's failure to
provide specific reasons for credit denial. Also, in class actions, creditors can lose up to the
lesser of 1% of their net worth or $500,000. Id. Regulation B's stiff penalty clause further
underscores the need to be sure that creditors clearly understand what type of reasons for
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reason rejected by the Berg court as inspecific would probably have
been acceptable to the Federal Reserve Board.1 04
A careful reading of various complaints made to the F.T.C.
and Wisconsin's OCB,105 along with court opinions that address
the specificity issue, suggests that creditors using judgmental sys-
tems can satisfactorily meet the objectives of the specificity re-
quirement if they make their minimum standards of creditworthi-
ness publicly known. For example, if the creditor uses the checklist
reason "length of employment" as the basis for denial, he could
also be required to disclose what exact period of employment (e.g.,
6 months, 1 year) would satisfy his requirements. The use of both
a checklist reason and an explanatory note obviously provides in-
formation sufficient to educate the applicant as to his ability to
obtain credit, and if an error has been made, the applicant is in a
position to correct it. Also, once an applicant is given this informa-
tion, he can intelligently work toward reducing the deficiencies in
his application. Moreover, the applicant is in a better position to
investigate a suspicion of discrimination, since he is aware of the
creditor's standards and his status in relation to those standards.
Although disclosure of the minimum creditworthiness stan-
dards furthers the objectives of the ECOA, 0 8 the ramifications of
adopting an expanded interpretation of "specificity" must be ex-
amined before such a recommendation can be sanctioned. From
the consumer viewpoint, a broader interpretation of specificity is
highly desirable for several reasons. First, if the creditor knows he
must support his checklist reason with an explanation, he will be
less likely to discriminate. However, if an applicant suspected dis-
crimination, a broader interpretation of specificity may, in some
cases, add an evidentiary basis to an otherwise unprovable suspi-
cion of discrimination. Also, as previously noted, requiring more
information from creditors would direct the applicant toward defi-
ciencies in his application, and allow him either to improve his ap-
plication or correct any misinformation.1 0 7 Finally, expanding the
denial sufficiently comply with the ECOA specificity requirement.
104. Note the similarities between the statement received by Mr. Berg and the model
statement. See Note 54 supra.
105. See note 57 supra.
106. See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra.
107. "[F]urnishing an applicant with a statement of reasons for adverse action has little
educational value if the applicant cannot translate the reasons into concrete criteria." Com-
ment, Equal Credit for All-An Analysis of the 1976 Amendments to the Equal Credit
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statement of reasons requirement to include disclosure of mini-
mum standards would meet the reasonable expectation that the
reasons for denial relate to the creditor's policies on creditworthi-
ness. Creditors, on the other hand, can be expected to question the
practicality of expanding the requirements of specificity. While few
creditors would argue with the Congressional goal of creating a
more informed and better educated class of consumers, most would
insist that the practical effects of requiring creditors to disclose
their standards of creditworthiness should be thoroughly investi-
gated before any action is taken to modify Regulation B.
B. Effect of Broadening the Meaning of Specificity on Judgmen-
tal Creditors
Several factors merit consideration in assessing the practical
effect of requiring judgmental creditors to publicly disclose their
minimum standards of creditworthiness by relating them to rea-
sons for denial. First, the difficulties of compliance must be ana-
lyzed. Second, the financial consequences of imposing such a re-
quirement must be discussed. Third, the non-financial implications
of the proposal, such as the fundamental change in the traditional
judgmental approach to screening credit applicants that would be
required, must be assessed. In the final analysis, these factors must
be considered in light of the benefits that would result from the
imposition of the more stringent requirement.
1. Difficulty of Compliance It would not be difficult for
judgmental creditors to comply with the proposed expansion of the
ECOA specificity requirement. Under the expanded interpretation,
these creditors would simply have to include a concise explanatory
statement along with the checklist reasons that denial was based
upon, making sure that this additional statement related to the
credit standards by which the applicant was judged. For example,
the creditor may give the checklist reason "insufficient income"
along with the accompanying explanation: "We require a minimum
income level of $10,000;" or, the checklist reason "inadequate col-
lateral" along with the explanation: "We accept only automobiles
and real property as collateral."
Such an expansion of the specificity requirement presupposes
two things. First, it assumes that judgmental creditors base their
Opportunity Act, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 326, 350 (1978).
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decisions on "creditworthiness" criteria that can be explained
briefly, each creditor having established criteria for judging an ap-
plicant's ability and willingness to repay.10 8 Secondly, use of the
expanded requirement does not mean that all checklist reasons will
require an explanatory note in order to achieve the desired degree
of specificity. Checklist reasons, such as "no credit file," "unable to
verify income," and "we do not grant credit to any applicant on
the terms and conditions you request" are self explanatory, and
appear to simultaneously provide the threshhold educational bene-
fit Congress intended for consumers and the brevity Congress in-
tended to ease a creditor's burdens.
Whether those checklist reasons warranting explanatory notes
can be briefly articulated depends primarily upon whether the
questions they raise can be briefly answered. As the following indi-
cates, the typical checklist reason can be explained briefly, often in
a single sentence:
CHEcKLIST REASONS WrrH EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS
"Checklist Reason"
Credit application incomplete
Insufficient credit references
Length of employment
Insufficient income
Too short a period of residence
Insufficient credit file
"Explanatory Statements"
You failed to list credit
references
We require a minimum of
three references
We require six (6) months
continuous emplyment
with one employer
We require a minimum
income of $10,000
We require a minimum of
four (4) months at the
same residence
We require a minimum of
three positive references;
your file contains only one
108. See text accompanying notes 154-160 infra.
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Delinquent credit obligations Your previous account with
us shows delinquency in
payments
Information obtained in credit Name of Agency, Street
report from consumer Address, Telephone
reporting agency is Number; Account in
inadequate question: Sears: File shows
delinquent payments
Temporary employment We consider all seasonal
workers to be temporarily
employed
It should be noted that checklist reasons accompanied by
brief, explanatory notes, are not foreign to judgmental creditors, as
a number of them already adhere to this format.Y00 Interestingly,
some judgmental creditors who provided explanatory notes prior to
Regulation B, may now be reluctant to deviate from the Federal
Reserve Board's form.110 In this respect, the promulgation of Regu-
lation B has actually decreased consumer awareness of what con-
stitutes creditworthiness. Since compliance with the Board's form
provides immunity from violation,""' those who undertake the task
of providing a higher degree of specificity must carefully draft
their statements to achieve consistency with Regulation B. Other-
wise, they run the risk of unnecessarily inviting litigation based on
technical violations of the specificity requirement.11 2 Thus, Regula-
tion B as presently interpreted, does not provide incentives for
creditors to be more specific than the checklist format. Lack of
such incentives contributes to creditors' feeling that use of the
Board's form is not only the easier but also the safer course of
action.
Finally, it should be noted that the difference between the
present reading and an expanded reading of Regulation B, in terms
of the effort a creditor must expend to comply, is slight. A con-
109. Note, Equal Credit Opportunity Act Anendments of 1976-An Overview of the
New Law, 55 N. CAROLiNA L. Rzv. 267, 271 n.20 (1977). For example, the North Carolina
Wachovia banks that offer Master Charge are instructed to include a checklist explanation
when informing a customer that his or her Master Charge application has been denied.
110. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(b)(2)(1980), and text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
111. Id.
112. Comment, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 633, 648 (1976).
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sumer complaint registered with the Wisconsin Office of the Com-
missioner of Banking (OCB) illustrates the slight difference this
change makes to the creditor while giving the applicant much
greater feedback. The applicant alleged that a bank did not list the
specific reasons for credit denial, having listed only "insufficient
income" and "inappropriate credit references" as the basis for re-
jection. When the OCB investigated the complaint, the bank clari-
fied these reasons. In explanation of "insufficient income," the
bank cited its investigation that indicated the applicant's monthly
expenses already consumed most of her income. In the bank's
judgment, the applicant could not financially handle an additional
credit obligation. In explanation of the "inappropriate credit refer-
ences" reason, the OCB was told that the bank was unable to ob-
tain credit information from the two oil companies the applicant
had listed as references.113 In other words, the bank could not ver-
ify her credit references. While the differences between what the
applicant was told and what the OCB was told appears at first
glance to be slight, closer scrutiny reveals that this "slight" differ-
ence is the difference between giving a comprehensive statement
which complies with the legislative objectives of the specificity re-
quirement and one which does not. In view of what a broader in-
terpretation of "specificity" would require in terms of creditor
compliance, it is clear that judgmental creditors would not encoun-
ter major difficulties in modifying their present statement of rea-
sons to conform with the more liberal readings of Regulation B.
2. Costs: Financial Consequences The cost of providing a
more detailed statement of reasons does not appear to be signifi-
cantly greater than that necessary to comply with the present
statement. Explanatory notes as to exactly why credit was denied
could easily be included on the currently used checklist. A mini-
mum amount of expense from additional paper work and staff time
would result, as the same person responsible for giving the check-
list reason could, as part of the same operation, be responsible for
113. Although stating that the credit bureau would not release information about the
accounts appears to be more specific than stating "inappropriate credit references," it may
not be specific enough. In Carroll v. Exxon Co., 434 F. Supp. 557, n.3 (E.D. La. 1977), Exxon
stated that the reasons for denial were that the credit bureau could furnish little definitive
information concerning the applicant's credit record. The court held that this reason was
not "specific" and found Exxon in violation of the specificity requirement. See text accom-
panying notes 96-99 supra.
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supplying the explanation. The additional time required to supply
the explanation would be minimal and would not involve expenses
incongruous with those Congress deemed justifiable to achieve the
ECOA objectives.
During Congressional hearings on the 1976 amendments to the
ECOA, Congress weighed the expense of providing applicants with
reasons for denials against the potential benefits. Despite testi-
mony from creditors, 114 the opposition of several members of Con-
gress,11 5 and data from various sources,"' indicating that the cost
of complying with the statement of reasons requirement would be
significant,117 the majority of Congress took the position that bene-
fits outweighed the costs. In response to arguments that giving spe-
cific reasons for denial would be "burdensome, expensive and un-
114. Id. Drew Tidwell, Legislative Counsel for Consumer Bankers Association, has esti-
mated the compliance cost to be $9.68 per application rejected. See Comment, Equal Credit
Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, supra note 1, at 214 n.66.
115. See S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1976); reprinted in [1976] U.S.CoDE
CONG. & An. NEws 403. Several members of Congress shared the creditors' concern that the
statement of reasons requirement placed too severe a financial burden on them and thus on
consumers. Senator Jesse Helms expressed the view that the requirement would result in
"regulatory overkill" which could harm those it is intended to benefit by drying up credit
sources, making credit more expensive, or both. He emphasized that the paper work cost
would ultimately force many merchants, especially small ones, out of the credit business. He
concluded that not only would the independent retailer business be hurt, but also that con-
sumers' financing choices would be limited. Id. at 21. Senator Jake Garn expressed similar
objections to the statement of reasons requirement. He thought the requirement might im-
pose a great financial burden on creditors, who would ultimately transfer the additional
costs to consumers. Id. As Senator John Tower stated: "Ultimately, the costs of such written
notification must be borne by borrowers, and the paperwork burden and administrative ex-
pense associated with such written notification could easily outweigh any realized or antici-
pated benefits." Id. at 27.
116. Forrest D. Jones, speaking on behalf of the American Bankers Association, esti-
mated that the cost of complying with the ECOA specificity requirement "would amount to
literally million(s) of letters with a large increase in staff and expense to prepare for these
letters," ECOA Hearings, supra note 15, at 265, and he concluded that the production cost
of the statements was disproportionate to the expected benefit. The American Retail Feder-
ation and LT.T. Aetna Corporation concurred. Id. at 409, 611. See also Smith, The Equal
Credit Opportunity Act of 1974: A Cost Benefit Analysis, 32 J. FIN. 609, 614 (1977).
117. A spokesman for the National Retail Merchants Association, testifying before the
Congressional Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, described the potential cost of compli-
ance as "monumental" and "staggering," and presented supporting data from Sears, Roe-
buck and Co.'s 1974 estimation that a statement of reasons would cost approximately $5.00
per letter, thus running that retailer's total cost of compliance into the millions. See ECOA
Hearings, supra note 15, at 399 (statement of Robert Meyers). See also Smith, supra note
116, which notes that based on these estimates, compliance in 1975 would have cost the
credit industry $286.25 million. Id. at 614.
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necessary,"11 one Congresswoman presented the majority's posi-
tion on the cost factor by stating:
Without a requirement in the law and regulations to disclose the true reasons
for rejection, creditors who may have perfectly good reasons for rejecting such
an applicant (or who have made an innocent error in reaching the decision)
face the possibility of unnecessary lawsuits alleging discrimination when the
matter could have been straightened out quickly by a simple and direct ex-
planation for the rejection.... Instead of being a burden to the creditor,
this could be an effective device for avoiding unnecessary ill will among po-
tential customers.119
Senator William Proxmire, while finding the specificity require-
ment justified because an "informed consumer is essential if we are
going to have an effective market economy,"1 20 warned against
forcing overdisclosure.1 12  Likewise, the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs voted in favor of the specific-
ity requirement, although acknowledging that the requirement
could, in some respects, be a double-edged sword. The fact that
Congress enacted the specificity requirement despite strenuous ob-
jections from the credit industry indicates that they perceived the
potential additional financial burden on both the credit industry
and the consumer as necessary.
Congress' acceptance of the expense and their emphasis on
achieving the goals which initially prompted the promulgation of
the specificity requirement continues to support maximum efforts
toward this end. However, if creditors and consumers are to be re-
quired to make financial sacrifices to comply with the specificity
requirement, they should reap the full extent of the benefits Con-
gress intended. For this reason, it is important that a statement of
specific reasons meet a level of specificity in harmony with Con-
gress' stated objectives; otherwise, it would be difficult to assert
that the benefits flowing from the requirement outweigh antici-
pated and proven financial expenditures. Expanding the definition
of specificity to require creditors to relate the reasons for denial to
concrete creditworthiness standards provides the desired level of
118. See ECOA Hearings, supra note 15, at 34.
119. Id. (reply by Congresswoman Lenore Sullivan to questions submitted by Senator
John Biden).
120. Id. at 211.
121. Senator Proxmire limited his position by insisting that the information disclosed
"ought to be only that which is essential to provide the information that is required. . .
Id.
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specificity.
3. Costs: Non-financial consequences The most significant
non-financial consequence of expanding the meaning of specificity
is the potential for disruption of the judgmental system's founda-
tion. Traditionally, judgmental systems have operated under the
assumption that an experienced loan officer or credit manager can
use his professional instinct to screen credit risks. This flexible pol-
icy allows the manager to occasionally take a chance on a poor risk
applicant if the manager has a "hunch" the applicant will repay.
Similarly, if all indices of creditworthiness are positive, but the
manager has an intuitive feeling that the loan should be denied,
the loan is denied. It is this subjective elasticity which has made
judgmental systems attractive to many creditors.
Many creditors who use judgmental systems consider infor-
mality and flexibility to be the system's major assets. According to
one bank president, judgmental systems are favored because of
their "very flexible and personal approach. ' 122 Another bank presi-
dent favors the latitude which judgmental systems allow, because
she believes in making credit decisions based in part on "first im-
pressions" received from personally conversing with prospective
customers.1 23 Requiring a judgmental creditor to express specific
reasons for denial based on concrete credit policies would act to
bar decision making based even in part on premonitions. To a
large extent, such a requirement would take the "judgment" out of
judgmental systems, since "hunches" and "intuitions" are virtually
nonquantifiable. For example, under the expanded specificity re-
quirement, if two similarly situated applicants failed to meet a
creditor's express creditworthiness standards, a loan officer could
not approve a loan to one of them based on his "feel" for the per-
son. This would be true despite the officer's proven ability to sub-
jectively determine when objective indicators should be disre-
garded and the risk incurred. The expanded specificity re-
quirement would transform judgmental subjectivity into objectiv-
ity. The creditor would have to eliminate the use of all subjective
factors and rigidly adhere to policies on creditworthiness, disre-
garding any urge to deviate. In this respect, requiring the judgmen-
122. Letter from Emily H. Womach, President of Women's National Bank, to author
(Nov. 1, 1978).
123. Letter from Eve R. Grover, President of the First Women's Bank of Maryland, to
author (Dec. 28, 1978).
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tal creditor to relate reasons for denial to rules on creditworthiness
would tamper with his traditional, independent evaluation of an
applicant for credit. This could mean reduction of available credit
to the marginally qualified by stopping creditors from extending
credit to any member of this group of applicants.
Congress was made aware of these potential consequences
prior to the passage of the 1976 amendments to the ECOA. A
spokesman for the National Retail Merchants Association told
Congress that the proposed specificity requirement would in effect
give the Federal Reserve Board the authority to:
freeze credit granting criteria into established molds, to the detriment not
only of the creditor but of the consumer as well. This would have the effect of
introducing one rigid structure in the credit granting process, i.e., immobiliz-
ing criteria so that the creditor's: option of employing its own funds to extend
credit to an applicant could almost be viewed as mandated rather than volun-
tary on the creditor's part.
11
'
In the face of the knowledge that the specificity requirement could
lead to derogation of traditional credit evaluation systems, Con-
gress nevertheless voted in favor of the original requirement. In
effect, Congress decided that the anti-discrimination purposes ex-
pected to be obtained from the original requirement outweighed
the need to preserve the fundamental structure of the judgmental
system.
4. Costs: Discrimination deterrence, what price? Unfortu-
nately, it is impossible to impose a tougher specificity requirement
on judgmental creditors without additional cost. But whatever the
increased cost, it will only minimally affect the larger creditors,
most of whom are already following the trend toward credit scor-
ing.125 For these large creditors, the overall cost of imposing a more
stringent specificity requirement will be sharply reduced by the
adoption of a scoring system. However, smaller creditors, who
would be directly affected by the proposed changes, will under-
standably question the efficacy of modifying Regulation B in a way
which increases their economic burdens and impinges upon their
business freedom. Again, their question cannot be answered with-
out balancing the competing interests involved. For example, one
inherent danger of the increased costs would be the inevitable clos-
124. See ECOA Hearings, supra note 15, at 400.
125. Id. at 34.
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ing of smaller businesses by merchants who could no longer afford
to extend credit.126 The folding of these businesses would reduce
the credit options of some and in effect deny credit to others who
might have otherwise received it. Also, as previously discussed, an-
other harsh reality of expanding the requirement would be to fur-
ther erode the subjective element in credit granting that has tradi-
tionally been the backbone of judgmental systems. However, these
realities must be balanced against the consequences of non-expan-
sion, including widespread discrimination. Without requiring cred-
itors to relate reasons for denial to creditworthiness standards,
there is no way to guarantee that a judgmental creditor's "feel for
the person" is not a "feel" for the person's sex, race or age. Too
often, intuition is a cover for discrimination, and while all judg-
mental creditors may not illegally discriminate, it will be difficult
to separate those who discriminate from those who do not, absent
the imposition of a more demanding specificity requirement. Of
course, the proposed modification carries no guarantees that if
adopted, all discrimination by judgmental creditors will cease.
These creditors should, however, be less inclined to discriminate
since it would become difficult for them to escape detection.
If eradication of credit discrimination is a serious and desira-
ble goal of the ECOA, then any regulation enacted to achieve this
goal must be carefully drafted so that it will go far enough toward
curbing discriminatory practices and toward providing the neces-
sary evidence of discrimination for prosecution. Judgmental credi-
tors should not confuse freedom of business judgment with free-
dom to discriminate. Although the current model statement of
reasons seeks to interfere with creditor judgment only to the ex-
tent necessary to accomplish the specificity requirement's objec-
tives, it does not go far enough to accomplish these objectives. The
proposed modification solves this problem by requiring creditors to
relate the reasons for credit denial to creditworthiness standards.
C. Summary: Judgmental Systems and the Specificity
Requirement
The ECOA specificity requirement is designed to further two
Congressional objectives: providing an education benefit to the
consumer and improving administrative enforcement of the general
126. See note 115 supra.
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provisions of the Act. It is contemplated that the consumer will
become better educated by receiving statements that specifically
disclose the reasons underlying the decision to deny credit. It is
also hoped that the disclosure requirement will help to identify vi-
olators of the ECOA and serve as an incentive for non-violators to
continue to conduct their lending practices in a non-discriminatory
manner. The specificity requirement objectives logically imply that
creditors must relate reasons for credit denial to specific policies
on creditworthiness. In many respects, the model checklist state-
ment of reasons used by most judgmental creditors does not
achieve these objectives. The proposed statement requires credi-
tors to disclose criteria on creditworthiness relating to denial and
thus seeks to cure the deficiencies in the model form.
The costs of complying with the present specificity require-
ment, while undeniably major in some cases, are justifiable in light
of the requirement's stated purpose. The proposed modification
would not significantly increase these costs. It could be argued
however, that any increases in a creditor's already substantial eco-
nomic burdens would be significant. Nevertheless, the ECOA's leg-
islative history clearly supports any adjustments necessary to ac-
complish the Act's objectives.
III. MEETING THE SPECIFICITY REQUIREMENT: CREDIT SCORING
CREDITORS
A. Inadequacies in Present Practices
The problems of compliance with the ECOA specificity re-
quirement are not confined to judgmental creditors; credit scoring
creditors also have their share of problems. As noted earlier, credit
scoring systems allocate numerical values to those personal charac-
teristics which are considered key attributes of creditworthiness,
and the decision to grant credit is based on the applicant's total
score. Problems of compliance arise when credit scoring creditors
attempt to translate a nonqualifying score into a statement of spe-
cific reasons. For example, consider the following hypothetical
credit scoring system and its application to a hypothetical
applicant. 127
127. See Credit Scoring: Why and How, supra note 5, at 12, 14.
1980] 105
106 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29
HYPOTHETICAL CREDIT SCORING SYSTEM
Applicant Characteristics Allotted Points
Home Phone
Yes 36
No 0
Own or Rent
Own 34
Rent 0
Other Finance Company Debt
Yes 
-12
No 0
Bank Credit Card
Yes 29
No 0
Applicant Occupation
Professional and Officials 27
Technical and Managers 5
Proprietor 
-3
Clerical and Sales 12
Craftsman and Nonfarm-laborer 0
Foreman and Operative 26
Service Worker 14
Farm Worker 3
Checking or Savings Account
Neither 0
Either 13
Both 19
Applicant Age
30 or less 6
30+ to 40 11
40+ to 50 8
Over 50 16
Years on Job
5 or less 0
5+ to 15 6
Over 15 18
HYPOTHETICAL APPLICANT AND THE CORRESPONDING CREDIT SCORE
Applicant's Characteristics Allotted Points
Home Phone 36
Rents 0
No other finance company debt 0
Bank credit card 29
Farm worker 3
Both checking and savings accounts 19
Age 48 8
Same job for 18 years 18
113
If a favorable decision requires 114 or more points, the applicant
will be denied credit; however, it will be unusually difficult to pro-
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vide a statement of specific reasons for denial that is consistent
with the ECOA objectives. There seems to be a relationship be-
tween the characteristics for which the applicant received the few-
est points (renter status, occupation and age) and denial, but can it
be said that credit is denied because the applicant is a 48 year old
farm worker who rents? Probably not. Thus, the problem of how to
translate the applicant's denial into an accurate statement of rea-
sons for credit denial is presented.
Consumers have complained that the reasons for denial given
by credit scoring creditors violate the ECOA specificity require-
ment.12 One rejected applicant complained to the F.T.C. that the
credit scoring system itself was not adequately explained to her.129
The applicant, rejected under a creditor's scoring system, received
a statement of reasons which related the denial to the creditor's
point formula. The statement showed the applicant scored lowest
in the "time on the job" and "credit references" categories. Dissat-
isfied with this response, the rejected applicant wrote for further
clarification of the reasons for denial, and for the creditor's mini-
128. One of the earliest complaints challenging the specificity of a credit scoring credi-
tor's reasons was filed in December, 1976 against Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.. The
F.T.C.'s complaint charged that a number of rejected applicants were not given specific rea-
sons for denial. The applicants had received a statement which informed them that they
had failed to meet the minimum point score under Montgomery Ward's credit scoring sys-
tem. Because the specificity requirement had not yet become effective, the complaint
charged a violation of the original regulation, C.F.R. § 202.5(m) (1975) which required credi-
tors to give reasons for denial if rejected applicants requested them.
On October 5, 1977, the F.T.C. motioned to have the complaint against Montgomery
Ward dismissed. United States v. Montgomery Ward, No. 77-9092 (D.C. 1977) (complaint
withdrawn by plaintiff). The Commission indicated that although dismissal was appropriate
at this time because the complaint was issued prior to the effective date of the 1976 ECOA
amendments, it would reissue the complaint if further investigation revealed that Montgom-
ery Ward was violating the ECOA as amended. A new complaint containing essentially the
same allegations was subsequently filed on May 5, 1979. A few weeks later the Federal
Trade Commission announced that Montgomery Ward had entered into a consent judgment
in which it agreed to pay a $175,000 civil penalty to settle charges that it had violated the
ECOA by failing to give consumers who were denied credit accurate and specific reasons for
the denial. F.T.C. News, May 29, 1979. Similarly, an applicant who had been denied credit
complained to the F.T.C. that she did not understand the reasons for denial and felt she
was entitled to an additional explanation. The creditor's statement of reasons for denial
indicates that a credit scoring system had been used and that credit was denied because the
applicant did not receive the system's maximum score in the categories, "housing classifica-
tion" and "source of other income." See note 54 supra. Due to random sampling technique
used and F.T.C. confidentiality policies, the complainant's name cannot be revealed.
129. Id. This information was obtained through the author's search of consumer com-
plaint files. See note 56 supra.
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mum requirement for time on the job and the number and type of
credit references required. The creditor responded that the infor-
mation requested could not be given because there were no mini-
mum standards, and apologetically explained that because differ-
ent point values are assigned to each factor considered, concrete
standards for any one factor could not be established.130 The credi-
tor further explained that the most information it could provide
would be to list the five categories in Which the applicant failed to
score the maximum number of points. Still frustrated, the appli-
cant again corresponded with the creditor and voiced her dissatis-
faction, stating that she still could not understand why she was
denied credit.13 1 Unfortunately, the F.T.C. response to complaints
such as this one does not effectively address the consumer's com-
plaint. The F.T.C. usually responds by sending the consumer gen-
eral information on scoring systems and the ECOA provisions. It
further informs the rejected applicant that although it does not
handle individual ECOA complaints, it will collectively use indi-
vidual complaints to investigate a creditor if it suspects that the
creditor's actions represent a pattern of discrimination in violation
of the ECOA rather than an isolated occurrence. Thus, the F.T.C.
leaves unresolved the question of how credit scoring creditors
could give specific reasons, while the creditors continue to claim
that they cannot make their denials more specific because they are
unable to state them in the manner suggested by the Federal Re-
serve Board's model checklist form.3 2 Furthermore, these creditors
argue that denial is usually based upon the interplay of a variety of
factors which cannot be reduced to a standard form; indeed, even
the Federal Reserve Board concedes that the interdependence of
these factors, no one of which controls the decision making pro-
cess, makes it almost impossible to articulate the reasons why
credit is denied.133 These comments suggest a serious problem: re-
gardless of their predictive value, credit scoring systems lack suffi-
cient precision to specifically explain the reasons for rejecting
applicants.
The Federal Reserve Board offers little guidance to creditors
on how they can develop and articulate the reasons for their deci-
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
133. See ECOA Hearings, supra note 15, at 400.
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sion, beyond directing them to the Regulation B form.1 3 Further-
more, even when credit scoring creditors attempt to comply with
the specificity requirement by using the model checklist, they still
find themselves answering complaints alleging ECOA violations.
For example, United States v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc.,5 5 the
Attorney General charged that Federated, a credit scoring creditor,
used checklist reasons that violated the ECOA specificity require-
ment. s13 The complaint alleged, among other things, that Feder-
ated's use of the reason "inadequate credit references" failed to
reflect the actual or specific reason for credit denial because it
could be interpreted several ways: "inadequate credit references"
could mean "insufficient number of positive references," "excessive
number of references which the creditor considered to be negative
predictors of creditworthiness" or "no credit references." This am-
biguity led the Justice Department to conclude that the reason is
inconsistent with the specificity requirement since it serves no edu-
cational purpose. 87 Significantly, the Justice Department's dissat-
isfaction with Federated's statement of reasons went beyond sin-
gling out individual reasons which were not specific. The complaint
indicates that the Department believed the entire statement was
defective because Federated gave no explanation about the use or
operation of its scoring system.13 8 In a consent judgment 3 9 drawn
134. Letter from Federal Reserve Board to Bank of California (Apr. 26, 1976). In this
staff opinion letter, the Board explained to the Bank of California that its general explana-
tion of its credit scoring system did not adequately inform an applicant of the specific rea-
sons for credit denial. Without expressly suggesting methods of compliance, the Board cited
the literal language of the specificity requirement as prohibiting the Bank's general state-
ments explaining credit scoring. The Board did imply, however, that specificity could be
achieved by use of its model Regulation B checklist or one similar to it. Id.
135. No. 78-730 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (complaint withdrawn by plaintiff).
136. Id. The complaint was filed against Federated pursuant to the Attorney General's
independent grant of authority to enforce the ECO when he suspects a pattern and prac-
tice of discrimination in violation of the Act.
137. Id. Based on these conclusions, it appears that the Justice Department would like-
wise charge that checklist reasons such as "insufficient credit references," "insufficient
credit file," and "inadequate collateral" lack specificity. Like "inadequate credit reference,"
these reasons are ambiguous and fail to impart meaningful information to rejected credit
applicants.
138. Id. Federated's statement contained the following denial reasons:
1. Credit application incomplete
2. Inadequate credit references
3. Unable to verify credit references
4. Temporary or irregular employment
5. Unable to verify employment
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up by the Justice Department, Federated agreed to pay $50,000 in
punitive damages, to provide notice to all credit applicants who
were denied credit because they were improperly evaluated, and to
inform them of their right to reapply and be evaluated according
to the requirements of the ECOA and Regulation B. To insure
proper re-evaluation, Federated discontinued using its statement
of reasons and prepared a new one using the guidelines set forth in
the consent decree.140 Based upon these guidelines, it is apparent
6. Length of employment
7. Insufficient income
8. Excessive obligations
9. Unable to verify income
10. Inadequate collateral
11. Too short a period of residence
12. Temporary residence
13. Unable to verify residence
14. No credit file
15. Insufficient favorable credit experience
16. Delinquent credit obligations
17. Garnishment, attachment, foreclosure, repossession, suit or similar adverse
credit experience
18. Bankruptcy
19. We do not grant credit to an applicant on the terms and conditions you
request.
20. Insufficient bank references
21. No home telephone
22. Age group
23. Living status
24. Type of employment
25. Other
139. United States v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 78-730 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (consent
judgment entered Nov. 16, 1978). In a stipulation order which was attached to the consent
decree, the government agreed that Federated's documentary material on how it derived its
"neutral number of points," or point maximum for each characteristic scored, could be de-
leted from the public record. Federated claimed that its method of deriving its "neutral
number of points" contained confidential trade secret data and thus should not be made
public. Id.
140. The consent decree permits the use of a checklist reason if the reason is one which
(1) significantly affects the decision to deny credit, (2) relates to a criterion for which the
applicant failed to receive the "neutral" number of points, or (3) produces the greatest dif-
ference between the applicant's score and the maximum number of points obtainable for
each criterion. Id. It appears that the following would be acceptable:
Dear Applicant-
We regret that an account cannot be established at this time. We used a
credit scoring system which scored the information we had concerning you and
found that you did not achieve the score required for the credit for which you
applied.
Checked below are the factors which most significantly affected our decision
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that Federated may properly give a statement of specific reasons
which informs a rejected applicant that a scoring system was used
and that the factor which most significantly affected the decision
to deny credit was inadequate credit references. 141 This statement,
however, still appears to conflict with the ECOA specificity re-
quirement since the ambiguity of inadequate credit reference as a
reason is neither eliminated nor even minimized when prefaced
with a statement indicating that a credit scoring system was used.
Merely changing the introduction to a checklist statement of rea-
sons does little to make Federated's revised statement more intelli-
gible than the one they originally drafted.142 Specificity is not
achieved by merely associating checklist reasons with a creditor's
point scoring system.
There are other problems with the Justice Department's reso-
lution of the Federated case. For example, the Department's deter-
mination that the checklist reason, "inadequate credit references,"
lacks specificity is inconsistent with Regulation B. The Federal Re-
serve Board states in Regulation B that creditors who use the
model checklist reasons cannot be found in violation of the speci-
ficity requirement,143 yet the complaint in Federated was filed
against a creditor who gave reasons substantially similar to those
sanctioned by the Board. It seems that this inconsistency went un-
noticed, as it was not raised in the consent decree or in any other
to deny your application for credit:
-- insufficient credit references
.. credit application incomplete
-.unable to verify credit reference
.length of employment
-delinquent credit obligations
-too short a period of residence
-we do not grant credit to any applicant on the terms you requested
insufficient income
-excessive obligations
.nadequate collateral
no credit file
-temporary residence
-bankruptcy
-unable to verify employment
-other, specify
141. Id.
142. Compare the Federated statement of reasons, supra note 138, to the F.T.C. state-
ment of reasons based on guidelines in the Federated consent decree, supra note 140.
143. 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(b)(2) (1980).
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document relating to either the complaint or the eventual
settlement.
The Justice Department's position produced problems from
the onset. The Department suggested that Federated could comply
with the specificity requirement by disclosing that a scoring system
was used and listing the factors producing the greatest difference
between the maximum points available and the applicant's score.
However, before these instructions were issued, the F.T.C. received
many complaints objecting to similar statements as being inconsis-
tent with the specificity requirement. 144 Thus, even before the Jus-
tice Department directed Federated to comply with the specificity
requirement in this manner, rejected applicants had severely criti-
cized similar statements as lacking the specificity Congress in-
tended. One applicant who complained to the Federal Trade Com-
mission in 1977 had received the following reasons for denial:
You did not receive the minimum score required for an account with us. The
principal reasons contributing to the decline are listed below:
age grouping occupational grouping
types of credit accounts specialty shop listed
The above list represents the areas where there was the greatest difference
between your actual score and the maximum points available.145
The applicant who received this statement found it completely un-
comprehensible and strenuously objected to its lack of specificity.
Unfortunately, these same objections can be made to statements
formulated according to the guidelines of the consent decree in
Federated. The difference between the statement of reasons re-
ceived by this applicant and one based on the consent decree
guidelines is negligible, and the same objections can be made about
both.
Thus, the Justice Department's attempt to help credit scoring
creditors comply with the specificity requirement fails in its essen-
tial purpose: to ensure that creditors provide rejected applicants
with clear and meaningful explanations of the reasons why credit
was denied so that the applicant can correct any mistake that may
have led the creditor to reject him, or change factors within his
144. The author's investigation of the F.T.C.'s ECOA complaint files in January, 1978
revealed that consumers strongly object to reasons which merely tell the applicant how
many more points he needs to receive credit, based on the areas in which he failed to
achieve the maximum points available. See note 57 supra.
145. Id. F.T.C. policies require that complainants' names be kept confidential.
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control which could cause the creditor to reverse the decision. The
guidelines suggest that the applicant should be given checklist rea-
sons indicating the areas where he failed to obtain the requisite
score for credit approval or a list of reasons which cumulatively
signify the areas where higher scores are needed for credit ap-
proval. However, neither interpretation allows the applicant to cor-
rect a mistake or change factors within his control which influ-
enced denial. While the applicant is given general information
about the scoring system and about his failure to meet its require-
ments, he receives no specific information as to why he failed to
meet the creditor's standards or as to what he can do to remedy
the defects in his application. Clearly, denial statements based on
the Justice Department's guidelines do not provide rejected appli-
cants with an opportunity to go back and find out what went
wrong or correct either errors or deficiencies. Consequently, the
guidelines fail to supply the benefits Congress intended rejected
applicants to receive.
In summary, the Justice Department's interpretation of the
ECOA specificity requirement in Federated is laden with conflicts.
The use of a statement of reasons based on the Department's
guidelines is inconsistent with its own assessment that reasons
such as "inadequate credit references" lack specificity. Also, the
Department's position that certain reasons are not specific directly
conflicts with the Federal Reserve Board's pronouncement that
these same reasons are specific. It also is in opposition to what con-
sumers want and need; even before the Department promulgated
these guidelines, many consumers were reacting adversely to denial
statements that were drafted according to similar guidelines. Fi-
nally, it is clear that the Department's guidelines do not further
the objectives of the ECOA. The inescapable conclusion is that the
Justice Department's interpretation of what suffices as a statement
of reasons is at best of minimal assistance to credit scoring credi-
tors in their efforts to meet the ECOA specificity requirement.
Despite the problems raised by the Justice Department's in-
terpretation of specificity, a statement of reasons for denial based
on its guidelines still has its proponents: most significantly, the
Federal Trade Commission. Since the F.T.C. was of counsel in
Federated, it presumably favored the terms and conditions of the
consent decree and, ultimately, any statement of reasons drafted
according to the decree's guidelines. More importantly, however,
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the Justice Department's position in Federated apparently was
predicated on similar guidelines proposed by the F.T.C. in In Re
Aldens, Inc.,146 a case involving another credit scoring creditor.
The F.T.C. complaint alleged that the following statement given
by Aldens to rejected credit applicants violated the ECOA specific-
ity requirement:
Your application for credit has been reviewed and at the present time we
may not open an account for you. Our decision was according to our usual
policies, and was based solely on information you supplied to us.147
In November, 1978, the F.T.C. accepted a consent order in Al-
dens14s which followed the pattern of the Federated order and
which would allow for statements of reasons similar to those based
on the Justice Department's guidelines in Federated.149 By its dis-
position of Aldens, the F.T.C. demonstrated its approval of state-
ments similar to those drafted by the Justice Department in the
Federated case. It should be remembered, however, that F.T.C. ap-
proval does not erase consumer objections to the specificity of such
statements,1 50 nor does it remove the obvious inconsistencies be-
tween the sanctioned reasons and the purposes Congress intended
they serve. Thus, to date, the enforcement authorities have failed
to resolve the problem of how credit scoring creditors can meet the
ECOA specificity requirement.
B. Alternatives for Credit Scoring Creditors
1. Disclosure of Minimum Standards of Creditworthiness
Unlike judgmental creditors, credit scoring creditors cannot resolve
the specificity problem by publicly disclosing their minimum stan-
dards of creditworthiness, because a credit scoring system does not
use "minimum standards" in the absolute sense. 51 A credit scoring
creditor can reveal the maximum points available under each crite-
rion for which the applicant failed to receive the maximum score,
or the minimum overall aggregate score necessary for credit ap-
proval. However, review of the hypothetical credit scoring system
146. 92 F.T.C. 916 (1978).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See note 139 and accompanying text.
150. See note 144 supra.
151. See note 159 infra, for a discussion of how a typical scoring system operates.
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described above indicates that merely revealing the maximum
points would not place a consumer in the position Congress in-
tended. Under the hypothetical scoring system, the maximum
number of points available for the "occupation" category is 27, and
the sample applicant received only 3 points. Informing the appli-
cant that he was denied credit because he failed to achieve the 27
maximum point score in this category is confusing and misleading.
The statement logically implies that the applicant would need to
receive 24 additional points under this criterion to receive credit.
This statement is inaccurate in this hypothetical because the sam-
ple applicant is only one point below the 114 preselected cutoff
score, and if he received one additional point under any of the cri-
teria listed, credit would be granted. Thus, only revealing the max-
imum qualifying score does not give the rejected applicant a clear
and meaningful indication of why credit was denied. Similarly,
only revealing the overall necessary score for credit approval fails
to comport with Congressional objectives because it is useless to
the applicant to know that he failed to receive the minimum quali-
fying score of 114 unless he also receives an explanation of how he
might achieve that score.
Since the statement's purpose is to give a rejected applicant
an opportunity to take remedial action or correct erroneous infor-
mation, an applicant must be given an explanation of the score de-
tailed enough to allow him to act. There is, however, a danger of
supplying explanations of why and how the applicant failed to
meet the creditor's minimum score which are so detailed that they
overwhelm a rejected applicant.15 Highly technical information
can have the effect of only adding to the applicant's confusion.
Conceptually, there is a point of diminishing return involved, and
it is possible that disclosure of all information which might con-
ceivably be useful to a rejected applicant will not result in a better
informed applicant. Because rejection is normally based on a com-
bination of variables, the denial explanation would have to include
a discussion of the possible ways the different variables could be
adjusted for the applicant to qualify. For example, the applicant
should be told that an increase in his score under one criterion
152. See generally Davis, Protecting Consumers From Over-disclosure and Gobbledy-
gook: An Empirical Look at the Simplification of Consumer Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L.
REv. 831 (1977).
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decreases the amount by which he must increase his score under
the other criteria. Such explanations could hinder rather than help
the rejected applicant understand the reasons for denial, unless the
applicant has more than a basic understanding of how scoring sys-
tems operate. Explaining the operation of scoring systems in a
manner which facilitates understanding the reasons for denial
could lead to lengthy and confusing statements of reasons which go
beyond the non-detailed, brief statements Congress regarded as
sufficient.153
Thus, the inherent conflict between the scoring system and
the specificity requirement is apparent. Credit scoring creditors are
incapable of giving precise, specific reasons for denial, even though
Congress has mandated that precision and simplicity are of para-
mount importance in the statement of reasons. From all indica-
tions, scoring systems and the specificity requirement, as presently
formulated, cannot coexist. In light of this realization, the practi-
cality of prohibiting the use of scoring systems should be carefully
examined.
2. The Practicality of Prohibiting the Use of Scoring Sys-
tems in the Credit Evaluation Process Scoring systems are be-
coming increasingly popular as more and more creditors use them
to replace their judgmental systems.5 The question of whether
the use of scoring systems should be discontinued in light of their
inability to comply with the ECOA specificity requirement requires
careful and thoughtful consideration. Although scoring systems
cannot comply with the specificity requirement, they do provide
some advantages over judgmental systems. Thus, in order to prop-
erly consider the question of their continued use, the advantages
and disadvantages of scoring systems must be discussed in light of
the objectives of the specificity requirement. The key determina-
tion to be made is whether the objectives of the specificity require-
ment outweigh the benefits derived from using scoring systems in-
stead of judgmental systems.
153. See note 53 supra.
154. Scoring systems have been in use since World War II. Computers Judge Your
Credit Ability, 18 EvRvYBoDy's MoNEY 3, 5 (No. 3). Recently, however, their popularity has
increased. More than 200 scoring system models are currently used by major retailers,
banks, oil, travel and entertainment credit card companies. Among those companies that use
scoring systems are Montgomery Ward, J.C. Penney, Spiegel, Sears, American Express,
Household Finance, Mobil Oil, and National Car Rental. See G. Chandler & D. Ewert,
supra note 1, at 19 n.3.
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a. Advantages of Scoring Systems to Creditors In compar-
ing scoring systems to judgmental systems, scoring systems are
said to be more advantageous to creditors because they objectively
consider only those factors that are permissible under the ECOA.
For example, the ECOA now prohibits consideration of such fac-
tors as sex, race and marital status in making a credit determina-
tion, but prior to the passage of the ECOA, many creditors consid-
ered these factors. Even though these factors can no longer be
considered, judgmental creditors find it difficult to disregard them.
Scoring system proponents assert that their system avoids this
problem because it allows them to simply delete such factors. In
contrast, judgmental creditors must rely on a loan officer's ability
to subjectively discount factors previously used. An officer's ability
to completely ignore these factors, however, is highly suspect. Scor-
ing system advocates believe that human judges cannot totally free
themselves of bias, and that only scoring systems can provide the
objective uniformity implicit in the ECOA's central theme that a
creditor shall not treat one applicant less favorably than another
for any prohibited reason.155 Furthermore, the use of credit scoring
systems allows creditors to reap various other significant bene-
fits. 156 First, scoring systems allow a creditor a great deal of control
over the decision making process since the cutoff score can be
raised or lowered depending on whether it is in the creditor's best
business interest to decrease or increase the number of loans made
at a particular time. Second, scoring systems eliminate the diffi-
culty of transmitting the skills acquired over the years by a senior
loan officer to a new loan officer and eliminate the cost of having to
155. See Churchill, Nevin & Watson, The Role of Credit Scoring In the Loan Pecision,
THE CREDrr WORLD, Mar. 1977 at 6; see also ECOA Hearings, supra note 15, at 447 (state-
ment of Richard E. Cremer).
156. See the following works by Churchill, Nevin & Watson: Credit Scoring- How
Many Systems Do We Need, THE CRmarr WORLD, Nov. 1977; Credit Scoring System, THE
CREDrr WORLD, Apr. 1977; The Role of Credit Scoring In The Loan Decision, supra note
155; Credit Scoring: Why and How, supra note 5; see also, Churchill & Nevin, Developing
and Assessing The Performance of Credit Scoring Systems, Apr. 1976, Wisconsin Working
Paper.
157. Although the use of uniform standards in the scoring system should enable the
creditor to better determine how much tightening or loosening is required, it must be
remembered that these decisions are subjective ones-made not by the system but rather by
various loan officers acting as agents on the creditor's behalf. See Credit Scoring: Why and
How, supra note 5, at 13.
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train new loan officers in the art of evaluating loan applicants.158
Third, more applications can be processed in a shorter time period
when a scoring system is used, because fewer credit checks are re-
quired. Scoring system creditors do not run credit checks on all
new applicants; instead, credit checks are made only on those ap-
plicants whose score falls within a preselected range. 159 Fourth, the
use of a scoring system allows a creditor to develop consistent
credit approval and rejection policies and to show that the same
standards are uniformly applied to all applicants; thus a charge of
unlawful discrimination is easier to defend. Fifth, scoring systems
provide creditors with the opportunities to collect useful informa-
tion about their borrowers. Since the applicant information can be
incorporated into the creditor's data processing system, it can eas-
ily be retrieved and used for a number of purposes: for example, to
develop an up-to-date profile of the company's loan portfolio, or to
develop forecasts of bad debts expected in the near future. For
these reasons, credit scoring systems are considered more advanta-
geous to creditors than judgmental systems. One study has shown
that the use of credit scoring systems would enable a judgmental
creditor to reduce his credii costs.16 0
b. Advantages of Scoring Systems to Credit Applicants
Credit applicants also benefit from the objectivity of scoring sys-
158. Montgomery Ward views the judgmental form of reaching credit granting deci-
sions as an "ait" rather than a "science" which must be taught through an apprenticeship
method. They believe that through this teaching process, the teacher will convey not only
his skills, but the benefit of his experience. The capacity of the teacher to successfully con-
vey the knowledge gleaned from his experience is limited, however, by the limited data
processing and recall capacities of the human mind. See ECOA Hearings, supra note 15, at
445 (statement of Richard Cremer).
159. Montgomery Ward, for example, follows a typical management process for using a
scoring Osystem to reach credit decisions. It operates as follows:
1. If the applicant's score falls below a predetermined minimum score, the
applicant is rejected immediately on the basis that the risk is too high.
2. If the applicant's score falls above a predetermined upper limit, the ap-
plicant is accepted immediately on the basis that the risk is acceptable.
3. If the score falls between the two limits, additional information is ob-
tained via a credit bureau report, direct investigation or both. Based on the in-
formation received, the applicant is accepted or rejected depending on whether
the final score with the information included is above or below the predeter-
mined minimum cut-off.
Id. at 442.
160. See Proposal For Development of Your Credit Scoring System, (1978) (General
Electric Credit Corp.), which concluded that use of a credit scoring system may allow a
judgmental creditor to save 20 to 35 percent in credit and collection expenses.
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tems,161 since the system's impartiality will in some cases provide
the applicant with a more equitable result than would the opera-
tion of a loan officer's built-in bias. The following situation illus-
trates this point: what happens if, a judgmental creditor's loan of-
ficer had been unsuccessfully attempting to collect from a plumber,
when another plumber asks for a loan? 1 2 The loan officer's recent
bad experience may well adversely affect his evaluation of the sec-
ond plumber and result in denial of the loan. In contrast, a scoring
system does not require time to regain an objective or impartial
composure that a judgmental loan officer might need. Similarly,
denial would seldom, if ever, result from consideration of any sin-
gle factor, or from an arbitrary policy like the four "B's" policy of
never lending to beauticians, bartenders, bricklayers, or barbers.
Judgmental creditors have, however, utilized such policies.163
As the ECOA's legislative history reflects, Congress favors the
use of scoring systems over judgmental systems because of the for-
mer's objectivity."6 Because they are more objective, Congress be-
lieves that statistical analysis reduces rather than increases illegal
discrimination and individual unfairness in credit evaluations.6 5
This belief is shared by several proponents of scoring systems,1 6
who state that "a credit scoring system is created for the purpose
of legitimately or fairly differentiating between high risk credit ap-
plicants and low risk applicants. 16 7 Another commentator noted
that "credit scoring may not be as friendly as a loan officer, but in
most cases it's probably fairer. Computers may be heartless, but
they're not prejudiced."1 68 Besides making the credit evaluation
process fairer and more objective, at least one commentator has
noted that the majority of lenders who use scoring systems have
found that they actually make credit more available.6 9 This belief
is supported by a report from a major scoring system developer,
who estimates that there are from 10 % to 40 % fewer denials as a
161. See generally ECOA Hearings, supra note 15.
162. Computers Judge Your Credit Ability, supra note 154, at 5.
163. See ECOA Hearings, supra note 15, at 436 (statement by Montgomery Ward).
164. S. Rnr. No. 689, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1977).
165. Id.
166. See Nevin & Churchill, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act: An Evaluation (Sept.
1977) (Wisconsin Working Paper).
167. Id.
168. Computers Judge Your Credit Ability, supra note 154, at 5.
169. Id.
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result of computer judging.170
c. Disadvantages of Scoring Systems Despite the arguments
for using scoring systems, scoring systems are arguably deficient
because they make loan decisions based on generalizations, distort
objectivity, .produce illogical results, and reflect past biases. Addi-
tionally, they are not always followed. 0
i. Scoring Systems Contradict the Underlying ECOA Phi-
losophy Apart from being inconsistent with the ECOA specificity
requirement, scoring systems directly contradict the underlying
premise of the ECOA. 71 The ECOA encourages creditors to treat
applicants indiscriminately on the basis of their individual
creditworthiness, while scoring systems group and evaluate appli-
cants based on the conduct of prior applicants. Critics note that
the major drawback to using a scoring system is that it "attempts
to predict the behavior of a group of people, not individuals. 1 7 2
Some members of Congress believed that saddling each applicant
with the statistical characteristics of similar prior applicants is in-
herently discriminatory, and they objected to "prediction based on
generalizations" during the ECOA hearings;1 73 however, Congress
170. Id.
171. See notes 127-44 and accompanying text.
172. Credit Scoring: Does It Ease Discrimination or Make Discrimination Easier?,
SAVINGS & LOAN NEws 72, 74 (July 1978).
173. Senator John Biden made the following comments during the Congressional hear-
ings on the 1977 amendments to the ECOA:
As we move toward this credit card society which encompasses everything, my
concern is that we will not have the old fashioned kinds of discrimination where
the credit manager doesn't want to give credit to Roosevelt Jones because
Roosevelt happens to be black, and he just doesn't like blacks.
I am getting less and less concerned about that kind of discrimination and
more and more concerned about the person getting caught between the rock and
the hard spot, becoming the statistic, the person becoming the punch card in a
computer and somehow falling into a general category which is used in a point
scoring analysis when really they are an exception to that category, and there is
no way they can get out from under it....
You know, in the name of objectivity, I am afraid we are getting more toward
a mechanized society which in fact will discriminate more than the risk we ran
when we had the plain old rednecked prejudiced antiblack who sat there and
said, "I don't want that boy to get no credit."
ECOA Hearings, supra note 15, at 455. Senator Biden was particularly disturbed that scor-
ing systems operate under generalizatons which lead to the deterioration of individuality in
the decision making process:
I am not sure that you should be able to use any statistical data which in fact
does not relate specifically to that person, John Doe, namely statistical data as
to how often he paid.
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did not see fit to proscribe the use of credit scoring systems.
Instead of evaluating each applicant independently, scoring
systems assume that each applicant will act like members of a spe-
cific group. For example, a scoring system might evaluate pregnant
applicants on the basis of a previous determination that, generally,
pregnant women will permanently leave the labor market after giv-
ing birth and therefore are poor credit risks. Obviously, such classi-
fications may not accurately reflect the conduct of all of the indi-
vidual group members the system purports to characterize.' 4 For
this reason, many believe that generalizations should be avoided
and that each individual should stand on his or her own merits
with respect to credit history.17 5 Of course, this system fails when
applicants are denied credit because they have never previously re-
ceived it.
ii. Credit Scoring is not Necessarily Objective Calling a
scoring system "objective" does not mean that it is objective in
fact. The following examples illustrate that while most data used
in scoring systems appears neutral, the point value restrictions
creditors place upon the characteristics scored can distort objectiv-
ity. Regulation B is silent on the point allocation process18 and
some scoring system points are allocated in a manner which allows
You can calculate as many statistics as you want about him. . . . That is one
thing. But when you make him part of a category which is totally beyond his
control, where he has no way of affecting what happens within that category,
and you in fact then impose upon him certain limitations because he falls within
that category, it seems to me to be a pretty insensitive thing to do.
Id. at 458.
174. The United States Supreme Court addressed this problem in City of Los Angeles
v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), which involved a pension contribution scheme that re-
quired female contributors to pay more than their male counterparts. The justification for
requiring the higher sum was that it had been statistically proven that, generally, women
live longer than men; therefore, they would receive more benefits from the pension fund.
Without denying the statistical findings, the Supreme Court held the contribution scheme
unconstitutional, primarily on the ground that the statistics generalized. In denouncing such
generalizations, the Court said: "Even a true generalization about a class does not justify its
use if there is at least one person within the class to whom the generalization does not
apply." Id. at 708. If the Court's reasoning signals future judicial reactions to such general-
izations, scoring systems stand within a clearly marked danger zone.
175. See S. REP. No. 239, supra note 53, at 4 (statement of Dr. Lee Richardson, Direc-
tor of the National Office of Consumer Affairs in Washington, D.C.).
176. The methodology of point allocation is beyond the scope of this article. However,
it should be noted that creditors usually hire scoring system development companies to
make the necessary point allocations. Capon, Credit Scoring-Some Unanswered Questions,
Am. Banker, Mar. 19, 1979, at 10.
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these facially neutral variables to serve as surrogates for variables
prohibited by the ECOA.17 7 For example, the variable "zip code"
appears to be neutral, but if zip code areas inhabited predomi-
nantly by minority groups receive the lowest point assignments,
then the courts may decide that a zip code was improperly used in
the scoring system.17 8 Similarly, "occupation" may appear neutral
on its face, but if predominantly "female" occupations717 are
awarded low point scores, the courts may again conclude that the
ECOA has been violated. 80 Another variable affecting a scoring
system's objectivity is "income source." The 1977 ECOA amend-
ments require creditors to consider income from sources other than
employment as any other income source would be considered. 81
Therefore, a scoring system which considers "occupation" but not
"income source" would appear to discriminate against persons who
do not work for their income. For example, a person receiving
$100.00 weekly unemployment compensation may receive no
points, while an employed person receiving an equal amount as
"salary" will receive points. Similarly, a retired person or an ali-
mony recipient would receive no points because his income is not
derived from an occupation. Since occupation is so closely linked
to income, a scoring system which neither considers income source
separately nor allows for its consideration under the occupation va-
riable does not adhere to the ECOA requirements.
iii. Scoring Systems are Illogical Another concern of scor-
ing system foes is that the systems sometimes defy logic. One
scholar illustrated a certain scoring system's senselessness by ex-
amining the following point assignments for the variables "time at
present address" and "time with employer:' 118 2
VARIABLE .............. TIME AT PRESENT ADDRESS:
Less than 6 months 39 points
6 months - 1 year 5 months 30 points
1 year 6 months - 3 years 5 months 27 points
3 years 6 months - 7 years 5 months 30 points
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. For example, nursing, clerical work and social work.
180. See Capon, supra note 176.
181. 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(5) (1980).
182. Capon, supra note 176.
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7 years 6 months - 12 years 5 months 39 points
12 years 6 months or longer 36 points
Not answered 36 points
VARIABLE .................... TIME WITH EMPLOYER:
Less than 6 months 31 points
6 months - 5 years 5 months 24 points
5 years 6 months - 8 years 5 months 26 points
8 years 6 months - 15 years 5 months 31 points
15 years 6 months or longer 39 points
Homemakers 39 points
Unemployed 29 points
Not Answered 29 points
Under this system, applicants who have lived at their present ad-
dress for less than six months are awarded 39 points, a level which
they could not reach again until they had maintained the same res-
idence for seven and one-half years. Furthermore, applicants who
have been residents for between six months and 1 year 5 months
(30 points) are considered more creditworthy than those who have
been residents for between 1 and 1/2 years and 3 years 5 months
(27 points). Even more absurd is the fact that under this system, a
person who does not answer the question receives more points than
applicants in fifty percent of the time categories scored. Further-
more, the "time with employer" variable shows that an applicant
who has been with his current employer for less than six months
cannot score more points, that is, cannot be considered more
creditworthy, until he or she has been with his or her employer for
more than 15 years. It is also interesting to note that this scoring
system indicates that it is better to be unemployed than to have
worked with one's employer for between six months and 81/2
years.18 3
The potential absurdity is even clearer when viewed in con-
nection with the specificity requirement's policy that applicants
denied credit are entitled to specific reasons for denial so they can
learn how to become an acceptable credit risk. How do you explain
to an applicant that the longer he retains his job and residence the
less creditworthy he will become, and that his chances of being
granted credit are greater if he moves his residence and quits his
job? This suggests a valid reason for "overriding" scoring system
determinations, or even discontinuing use of the system altogether,
183. Id.
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since a scoring system which requires an override to be logical does
not meet the fairness goals of the ECOA.
iv. Many Creditors Override the Scoring Systems In some
cases in which a credit applicant is rejected, the scoring system
prediction is disregarded and management subjectively grants
credit despite a total point score which would indicate denial to be
appropriate. This process is commonly referred to as "judgmental
override."' ' Overriding usually occurs because credit scores are
not always consistent with a credit manager's intuitive belief about
what characteristics accurately predict creditworthiness. 18 For ex-
ample, credit history is ordinarily unscored by scoring systems.
Many loan officers believe that there is a positive correlation be-
tween past and future repayment behavior and therefore consider
credit history in conjunction with the credit score.18 Thus, an ap-
plicant who scores below the cutoff may still receive a loan if his
record reveals an unblemished history of repaying his credit obliga-
tions. If, on the other hand, an applicant scores high but has a
poor repayment history, a loan officer may disregard the score and
rely on personal judgment. Therefore, the scoring sytem's score
may sometimes be used only as a guideline to weed out applica-
tions requiring no further review.18 7 It appears, however, that judg-
mental overrides are more often used to give low scoring applicants
the benefit of the doubt,""8 but regardless of their use, personal
overrides inevitably increase the potential for discrimination in
credit analysis 89 and lead to the potential problems of inconsis-
tency and unfairness found in purely judgmental systems.
v. Scoring Systems Have a Built-In Bias Scoring systems
are founded on the assumption that a creditor's future credit expe-
184. See Computers Judge Your Credit Ability, supra note 154, at 4. According to
Sandy Boone, attorney for the Federal Reserve System, Division of Consumer Affairs, the
majority of scoring system users override their systems. Statement made at Fair Housing
and Fair Lending Legal Seminar, in Madison, Wisconsin (Apr. 20, 1979). The author could
find no available statistics to indicate how prevalent overriding is, but there is some indica.
tion that most creditors depend to some degree on human judgment to personalize their
scoring systems. Id.
185. Id.
186. See generally, ECOA Hearings, supra note 15, at 440-43, 450-52 (statement by
Montgomery Ward & Co.).
187. See Computers Judge Your Credit Ability, supra note 154, at 4. See also note 159
and accompanying text.
188. See Computers Judge Your Credit Ability, supra note 154.
189. See Hsia, supra note 70, at 430.
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rience will mirror its recent past.190 Because data used to construct
the system may contain characteristics which were once legal but
are now prohibited by the ECOA, a system designed to reflect re-
cent creditor experience may in fact perpetuate past biases and
discriminatory lending practices. This creates what is often re-
ferred to as the dirty-data base 91 problem. For example, a system
may have been based on the characteristics which project a profile
of a married, white male as the most desirable credit risk. Such a
system unfairly discriminates against all single persons, minorities
and women. Many believe that the dirty-data base problem is fur-
ther compounded by the private nature of scoring systems which
makes it difficult to prove that the systems use biased data.192 Be-
cause the facts upon which the systems are based are not visible
from ordinary observation, it is questionable whether any scoring
system is in fact sound. Additionally, there is no standard to mea-
sure a system's fairness.19
While it is true that there is no universal method of testing a
scoring system's fairness, Regulation B does require creditors to
"validate" their systems. As noted earlier,9 the process of valida-
tion involves testing a scoring system by using a second, indepen-
dent set of data to check its predictive accuracy, and by examining
the characteristics scored to statistically determine whether the
system contains tainted data which may lead to illegal discrimina-
tion. For example, validation should allow a creditor to statistically
show that a higher rate of credit denial to women than men results
from their respective income levels or some other permitted varia-
ble rather than from their sex.1 95 Since Regulation B requires scor-
190. See ECOA Hearings, supra note 15, at 442.
191. The dirty-data base problem can be further explained by looking at how a scoring
system selects the most desirable credit risks. If a scoring system uses a creditor's past lend-
ing experience to define "good" and "bad" credit risks and the bad risk category includes
the characteristics of those individuals who were rejected in the past, the system may in
effect assign negative values to attributes possessed in high proportions by minorities, wo-
men, and other ECOA protected classes. Since factors such as marital status, race and sex
were legitimate considerations prior to the passage of Regulation B, many scoring systems
based on pre-Regulation B lending experience will not identify creditworthy members of the
ECOA protected classes as effectively as they identify creditworthy white males. See Note,
Credit Scoring and the ECOA: Applying the Effects Test, 88 YALE L.J. 1450, 1458 (1979).
192. See Computers Judge Your Credit Ability, supra note 154, at 4.
193. Id.
194. See text accompanying notes 79-83, supra.
195. See Baer, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act and "The Effects Test," 95 BANKING
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ing systems to be validated prior to their initial use1 98 and periodi-
cally thereafter, 197 creditors should have their validation infor-
mation available to defend against lending discrimination chal-
lenges, particularly challenges arising under Regulation B's "effects
test" provision.198 Essentially, the "effect test" bars conduct which
has the effect of discriminating against persons in the ECOA's pro-
tected classes. The creditor's intent is irrelevant for purposes of
applying the test, and the Federal Reserve Board has determined
that Congress intended the "effects test" concept to be carried
over to the credit field as it developed from court interpretations
in employment discrimination cases 99 such as Griggs v. Duke
Power Company200 and Albermarle Paper Company v. Moody.20 1
In Griggs, the United States Supreme Court held that require-
ments which appear to be neutral but which in fact operate to ex-
clude black job applicants at substantially higher rates than white
job applicants are prohibited under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, unless the employer shows that such requirements are
sufficiently related to job performance. °2 Thus, an employer could
violate the Act without intending to discriminate if the plaintiff
successfully shows that the questioned requirement has a dispro-
portionate impact on minorities and the employer fails to show its
job-relatedness. 203 In Albermarle, the Court attached an additional
step to the effects test by allowing an employee to defeat an em-
ployer's claim of job-relatedness by showing that the employer can
meet his legitimate business needs through a less discriminatory
alternative practice.04 One author suggests that, in the credit scor-
ing context, the effects test requires a credit applicant to show that
the scoring system disporportionately affects a protected class in
L. J. 241, 248 (1978).
196. 12 C.F.R. § 2 0 2 .2 (p)(3)(1 9 80).
197. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(p)(2)(iv)(1980).
198. 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(a) note 7 (1980).
199. Id.
200. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
201. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
202. 401 U.S. at 429-33. Black employees challenged their employer's requirement of a
high school diploma or acceptable aptitude test scores as a condition of employment because
these requirements excluded a disproportionate number of black applicants from qualifying
for available jobs.
203. See Credit Scoring: Does It Ease Discrimination or Make Discrimination Easier,
supra note 172, at 74-75.
204. See 422 U.S. at 425.
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order to establish a prima facie case. The creditor is then entitled
to rebut by showing that the system predicts creditworthiness.
This makes validation critically important for credit scoring credi-
tors. The validation process should establish the credit scoring sys-
tem's fairness. During validation a rejected applicant's suspicions
that a scoring system contains "dirty data" which results in illegal
discrimination will either be eliminated or substantiated. 05
While the validation process is undoubtedly beneficial to both
creditors and consumers, several iunresolved problems are associ-
ated with it. First, although Regulation B requires periodic
revalidation of scoring systems, "periodic" is undefined. Individual
determinations of validation frequently diminish a creditor's in-
centive to keep his scoring system free of "dirty data" and other
discriminating criteria. Second, Regulation B is silent as to the
number of complaints necessary to initiate validation procedures.
Will one complaint trigger the process? That is, if a rejected fe-
male applicant alleges she was discriminated against because of her
sex, will the creditor be required to prove through the validation
process that he does not discriminate against women? If not, under
what circumstances will creditors be required to support their
claim of non-discriminatory practices? Third, most scoring systems
use sample data from which the system was originally developed to
test the system's predictive effectiveness. The dangers associated
with validating scoring systems by using the same data that was
used to construct them are obvious. Although validation proce-
dures can be instrumental in pointing out scoring system biases,
their effectiveness will not become fully realized until validation
frequency, initiation and testing methodology problems are
resolved.
C. Summary: Scoring Systems and the Specificity Requirement
It is difficult to determine whether scoring systems will even-
tually be found to be at odds with the specificity requirement. One
thing appears certain: Congress favors scoring systems, the reserva-
tions of some members208 notwithstanding. However, it seems that
Congress had two principal objectives in mind when it incorpo-
205. See Hsia, supra note 70, at 418. See generally, Hsia, The Effects Test: New Direc-
tions, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 777 (1977).
206. See note 74 supra.
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rated the specificity requirement into the ECOA. First, it was con-
cerned that rejected credit applicants become meaningfully in-
formed about the reasons for rejection. Second, it was concerned
that creditors evaluate applicants objectively, that is, equally and
without regard to consideration of factors unrelated to credit-
worthiness. Scoring systems cannot satisfy the first objective be-
cause they are incapable of giving reasons for denial consistent
with Congressional intent.2 7 On the other hand, scoring systems
have the potential to objectively screen credit applicants, and thus
can be consistent with the second objective of the specificity re-
quirement, to eliminate discrimination.
The ECOA legislative history does not indicate that Congress
recognized these conflicting characteristics of scoring systems. In
view of this conflict, it seems that Congress will continue to sanc-
tion the use of scoring systems only if they can in reality produce
the objectivity Congress perceived as their redeeming quality. One
way to insure objectivity is by requiring closer administrative scru-
tiny of scoring system validation procedures. 20 8 As added insur-
ance, the Federal Reserve Board needs to establish meaningful val-
idation guidelines which would delineate the validation process
and control the frequency of revalidation. Additionally, promulga-
tion of a uniform method of validating scoring systems would help
identify unsound systems and resolve the "dirty data problem."
Stricter requirements for revalidation would help ensure the con-
tinued soundness of credit scoring systems.
Greater administrative monitoring, however, would not enable
creditors who use a credit scoring system to give specific reasons
for denial. But given greater administrative surveillance of the
scoring system's objectivity, it is possible that Congress would be
satisfied with denial reasons that do not strictly adhere to the re-
quirements of specificity. Thus, in order to gain scoring system ob-
jectivity, Congress might sanction a method of disclosing reasons
for denial similar to that suggested by the Justice Department in
Federated and the F.T.C. in Aldens,20 9 such as requiring the credi-
tor to state that a scoring system was used, and thereafter, to dis-
close the factors which produced the greatest difference between
207. See text accompanying notes 52-54 supra.
208. See Baer, note 195, supra at 258-59.
209. See notes 146-51 and accompanying text supra.
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the applicant's score and the maximum number of points obtaina-
ble for each factor. If these kinds of reasons are given, increased
agency enforcement will serve the additional purpose of policing
scoring systems. Consumers are forced to rely- on agency policing
because a list of the areas in which the applicant scored the lowest
will not give the consumer adequate information to pursue a sus-
pected claim of discrimination, to inform him of application defi-
ciencies, or to allow him to check on a credit systems validity.
It cannot be conclusively maintained that Congress intended
to differentiate between the manner in which scoring systems and
judgmental systems must comply with the ECOA specificity re-
quirement. If, however, practical meaning is to be given to the
Congressional policy in favor of scoring system objectivity and
credit denial specificity, the meaning of specificity as reflected in
the ECOA legislative history must be broadened to accommodate
both. Greater emphasis on proper validation prodecures, coupled
with the FTC and Justice Department suggestions for giving spe-
cific reasons, provide excellent starting points for broadening the
specificity concept. It should be remembered, however, that a
broader interpretation of "specificity" will not resolve the inherent
conflicts between scoring systems and the specificity requirement;
rather, it will merely reflect an attempt to satisfy the requirement
as much as possible while allowing for the continued existence of
properly validated scoring systems.
CONCLUSION
The problems of compliance with the ECOA specificity re-
quirement have recently received national attention. In April, 1979
the Federal Reserve Board requested public comment on how the
specific rules of Regulation B should apply to certain practices of
credit scoring creditors. 210 Among other things, the Board solicited
comments as to how scoring system creditors can give specific rea-
sons for denial which meet the objectives of Regulation B.2 11 By
210. See 44 FED. REG. 23,865 (1979).
211. Id. Specifically, the Board solicited comments on how Regulation B should be ap-
plied to the following scoring system practices:
(1) scoring number of jobs or number of sources of income;
(2) not scoring the amount of an applicants income from part-time employ-
ment, pension, or alimony;
(3) selecting the reasons for adverse action judgmentally; and
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soliciting public comment, the Board has acknowledged the gravity
of the specificity problem as it relates to scoring systems and has
made the first step toward resolving it. It can only be hoped that
while the Board is seeking solutions for scoring system creditors, it
will not overlook the fact that the problems faced by judgmental
creditors in meeting the ECOA's specificity requirement also re-
quire immediate resolution.
(4) using reasons for adverse action from the model statement when they do
not correspond to the characteristics scored.
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